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Gundy v. United States
Ruling Below: United States v. Gundy, 695 Fed.Appx. 639 (2nd Cir. 2017)
Overview: Herman Gundy was convicted of a sex offense. When Gundy was transferred to federal
custody in Pennsylvania, he received permission to travel by bus from Pennsylvania to New York
unsupervised. As a result, Gundy was convicted and sentenced to time served plus five years
supervised release for staying in New York without registering as a sex offender.
Issue: Whether the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of
authority to the attorney general to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violates the
nondelegation doctrine.
United States of America, Appellee
v.
Herman Avery GUNDY, AKA Herman Grundy, Defendant- Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on June 22, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
OETKEN, District Judge:

the case, to which we refer only as necessary
to explain our decision to affirm.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
June 16, 2016 judgment of the District Court
is AFFIRMED.

While serving a federal sentence for
violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306,
Sexual Offense in the Second Degree, during
his supervised release for a prior federal
offense, Gundy was transferred from
Maryland to a federal prison in Pennsylvania.
See United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140,
143 (2d Cir. 2015). As he approached the end
of his federal sentence, Gundy authorized the
Department of Justice to make arrangements
for his move to community-based custody.
He was ordered to be transferred to the Bronx
Residential Re-Entry Center, a halfway
house in New York, and he was granted a

Defendant-appellant Herman Gundy
appeals his conviction and sentence,
following a bench trial on stipulated facts, for
one count of failing to register as a sex
offender after traveling in interstate
commerce, in violation of the Sex Offender
Registration
and
Notification
Act
(“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and the procedural history of
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furlough to travel unescorted on a
commercial bus on July 17, 2012, from
Pennsylvania to the Bronx. Gundy arrived at
the Re-Entry Center as planned, and, on
August 27, 2012, was released from federal
custody there to a private residence in the
Bronx. Gundy did not register as a sex
offender in either Maryland or New York, as
state law required, and was arrested and
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Id. at 144.
After the District Court granted Gundy’s
motion to dismiss the prosecution for the
absence of a trigger for SORNA’s
registration requirement, this Court reversed
the dismissal and reinstated the indictment,
holding that the requirement was triggered
because Gundy was “required to register”
under SORNA no later than August 1, 2008.
See id. at 145.

voluntariness or mens rea requirement that
may apply, and thus found Gundy guilty of
violating § 2250. Following a sentencing
hearing, the District Court entered judgment
imposing a sentence of time served and a
five-year term of supervised release. Gundy
now appeals from that judgment.
Section 2250(a) imposes criminal
liability on anyone who (1) is required to
register under SORNA; (2) travels in
interstate or foreign commerce; and (3)
knowingly fails to register or update a
required registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
We held in our consideration of
Gundy’s earlier appeal that Gundy satisfies
the first requirement. There is no dispute that
he knowingly failed to register, thus
satisfying the third requirement. On appeal,
Gundy asks us to read in an exception to the
second requirement, travel in interstate
commerce, for a defendant who crosses state
lines while in federal custody. He contends
that holding otherwise would violate the
usual requirement of criminal law that
criminal acts be committed voluntarily. The
parties also dispute whether, on the stipulated
facts and conclusions of the District Court
following the bench trial, Gundy’s travel
from Pennsylvania to New York was
voluntary.

Upon the indictment’s reinstatement,
Gundy renewed his motion to dismiss on the
basis that the interstate travel requirement of
the statute was not satisfied because he was
still in custody when he traveled from
Pennsylvania to the Bronx. The District
Court denied the motion, holding that the
statute did not include an exception to the
interstate travel element based on a
defendant’s custodial status. The District
Court also held that, even if the statute did
include a voluntariness or mens rea
requirement, the allegations of the indictment
were sufficient for that issue to be resolved at
trial.

We decline to reach Gundy’s
argument regarding the interpretation of §
2250(a). Assuming arguendo that Gundy is
correct and that the travel element contains an
implicit voluntariness requirement, that
requirement is easily met on the facts of this
case. Although Gundy remained technically
in federal custody when traveling to the
halfway house in New York, the stipulated

A bench trial followed on stipulated
facts. The District Court found that each
element of the offense had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, including the
interstate travel
element and any
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facts at trial are sufficient to support the
District Court’s finding that Gundy’s travel
was voluntary. On the basis of those facts, the
District Court was free to conclude that
Gundy made the trip in question willingly, as
he authorized the initial transfer process and
then traveled by bus to New York on his own
recognizance. See United States v. Pierce,
224 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that
standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence is the same in a bench trial as a jury
trial). We need not and do not reach the
question of statutory interpretation because,
even assuming Gundy is correct that
interstate travel in § 2250(a) is limited to
voluntary travel, the District Court
reasonably found that the travel here was
voluntary.
* * *
We have considered Gundy’s
remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM
judgment of the District Court.

the
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“Sex Offender Case May Deal Blow To 'Administrative State'”
Law360
Jimmy Hoover

March 7, 2018

The U.S. Supreme Court took up a case this
week involving a convicted sex offender who
failed to register as such in New York, and
the legal question at the center of the
proceeding could lead to a ruling that reins in
the "administrative state" and hands
conservatives
a
major
win.

want
to
reverse.
The doctrine has not been used by the
Supreme Court to strike down a law passed
by Congress since 1935, but lawyers and
scholars on the political right have clamored
for its revival in recent years as federal
regulators have grown in size and power.
Court watchers were atwitter Monday after
the court decided to take the case.

In Gundy v. U.S., the high court has agreed
to decide whether the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act is
unconstitutional because, rather than saying
whether it applies to people convicted before
its passage, the statute simply passes that
determination off to the attorney general.
Petitioner Herman Gundy, whose underlying
sex conviction occurred a year before the law
was enacted, has said that SORNA violates
the
separation
of
powers.

“What’s interesting about this challenge is
that the possibility that a statute anywhere
right now might violate the non-delegation
principle suggests a revisiting of the whole
issue of whether the court should be in the
business of determining how much discretion
is too much discretion” for Congress to hand
the executive branch, said Evan Bernick, a
visiting lecturer at Georgetown University
Law Center.

At first glance, it might seem strange that
conservatives are looking askance at a law
passed to get tough on sex offenders. But the
case centers on the non-delegation doctrine, a
thorny judicial rule forbidding Congress from
passing laws that delegate legislative
functions to members of the executive
branch, in this case the attorney general. For
conservatives, the tendency of Congress to
hand over its constitutional duties to
unelected federal officials is one they dearly

Decades in the Wilderness
Believers in the non-delegation doctrine —
there are many skeptics — say it is based on
Article I of the Constitution, which states,
“All legislative powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”
Despite those early origins, the doctrine
didn’t enjoy its heyday until 1935, when in a
pair of now-famous cases the Supreme Court
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struck down portions of the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act — a key New Deal
law — because they gave the president
legislative powers over the poultry and
petroleum industries.

Judge Douglas Ginsburg, in a 1993 article,
said it was part of the “Constitution-in-exile
... kept alive by a few scholars who labor on
in the hope of a restoration, a second coming
of
the
Constitution
of
liberty.”

The court in the poultry case said Congress
can’t allow the president to “exercise an
unfettered discretion to make whatever laws
he thinks may be needed” without first laying
down policies and standards itself, or what’s
since been referred to as an “intelligible
principle.”

Recently, however, it has become part of a
broader conservative attack on the
administrative state that developed in
response to heavy regulatory activity under
the Obama administration.
Among its chief proponents is the newest
member of the Supreme Court, Justice Neil
Gorsuch, who in a 2016 opinion while he was
still on the Tenth Circuit suggested using
non-delegation
as
a
basis
for
overturning Chevron
USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council Inc., a 1984
Supreme Court decision that has armed
federal agencies with a powerful tool for
defeating rulemaking challenges.

But the Supreme Court quickly retreated
from its seemingly broad rulings in those
cases, and hasn’t wielded the scythe of the
non-delegation doctrine to fell congressional
statutes since.
While the court has never explicitly
renounced the doctrine, it has struggled over
the years to establish a rule for when a law
delegating power to the executive branch
lacks an “intelligible principle” to serve as a
guidepost for policymaking.

Gorsuch, whose opinion in that case was one
of the reasons behind his Supreme Court
nomination, has reiterated his desire to rein in
administrative power through the doctrine
since taking the nation’s top bench. “Our
founders did not approve lawmaking made
easy by bureaucratic fiat,” he said in a
November speech.

Because it is still technically on the books,
the doctrine has been called a “shotgun
behind the door” tempering Congress’
inclination to pass laws with broad
delegations of power. But Bernick said “the
shotgun isn’t apparently loaded, and hasn’t
been loaded for decades. It’s not really a
threat.”

The case granted by the justices Monday will
give him his first shot to do just that.
An Unlikely Vehicle

'Second Coming of the Constitution'?
Herman Gundy was sentenced to time served
and five years of supervised released because
he failed to register as a sex offender after he
was transferred from a federal prison in

Conservatives have sought to put teeth back
into the doctrine for years; then-Justice
William Rehnquist called for its return in a
famous 1980 concurrence, while D.C. Circuit
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Pennsylvania to a halfway house in New
York.

bunch of different areas of law, and I think it
could manifest itself in a case like this,” he
said.

Gundy filed a petition with the Supreme
Court in September, making various
challenges to the conviction. Among them
was his argument that SORNA violated the
non-delegation doctrine because it gave the
attorney general the decision of whether the
registration requirements should apply to
people whose sex offense convictions
occurred prior to the law's enactment in 2006;
Gundy was convicted of giving cocaine to an
11-year-old girl and raping her in October
2004, according to the government.

“What could happen in this context, you
could see an effort on the part of the court, a
number of members of which have expressed
skepticism about the administrative state and
its constitutional standing, to draw a 'thus far
and no further' principle,” he said.
Still, despite Justice Gorsuch’s passion on the
subject, Bernick believes the court will try to
narrow the scope of its ruling so as not to
unleash a Pandora’s box of non-delegation
challenges to various modern legislation,
much of which he said confers unto agencies
power “as great or greater than any power
that was conferred by the National Industrial
Recovery Act.”

“The authority to legislate is entrusted solely
to Congress,” Gundy, who is being
represented by the New York federal
defenders office, said in his petition.
“Because SORNA grants the attorney general
unfettered discretion to determine who is
subject to criminal legislation without an
‘intelligible principle’ to guide this
discretion, it violates the non-delegation
doctrine.”

“I think that Gorsuch and [Justice Clarence]
Thomas are both votes, if the opportunity
arose to articulate a very robust nondelegation principle that applies to
everything,” he said. “My skepticism is
whether there are more than two votes for that
principle.”

Bernick said the court’s decision to take on
the case is reflective of its “sense of unease”
about the growth of the administrative state.
“This sense of unease is going to inform a

The case is Gundy v. U.S., case number 176086, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“The Supreme Court May Revive a Legal Theory Last Used to Strike Down New
Deal Laws”
Slate
Mark Joseph Stern

March 5, 2018
Typically, the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibits the government from
applying a new criminal law retroactively to
punish an offender who committed his crime
before the law’s passage. But in 2003, the
Supreme Court rejected an Ex Post Facto
challenge to Alaska’s retroactive sex
offender registration act, holding that
Alaska’s measure was not sufficiently
“punitive” to violate the clause.

On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear Gundy v. United States, a constitutional
challenge to federal sex offender regulations.
If, like me, you believe that America’s
current
sex
offender
regime
is
draconian, unjust, and counterproductive,
that might sound like good news! And
perhaps it is. But there’s one aspect of the
court’s grant that may be very bad news from
progressive viewpoint: It will only consider
whether the policy in question violates the
nondelegation doctrine—a hazy legal
principle last used to strike down New Deal
legislation in 1935.

Thus, Herman Gundy—the defendant in this
case, who was convicted of a sex offense
before SORNA’s passage—decided to
challenge the federal law’s retroactivity
under the nondelegation doctrine. Under this
theory, Congress infringes upon the
constitutional separation of powers when it
delegates too much legislative authority to
another branch of government. Here, Gundy
asserts that Congress delegated an
unconstitutional amount of power to the
attorney general by allowing him to
determine how to apply SORNA
retroactively.

The law in question, the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),
required states to expand their sex offender
registries or lose millions in federal funding.
It also increased punishments for sex
offenders, keeping them in the registry for
decades, strictly limiting their freedom of
movement, and allowing them to be detained
for years in “civil commitment” after they
finish serving their prison sentences. Oddly,
Congress did not clarify whether SORNA
must
apply
to
sex
offenders
convicted before the law’s passage. Instead,
it gave the attorney general authority to apply
the law retroactively, which he did.

I am simultaneously sympathetic to and
terrified by this argument. On the one hand,
SORNA is a truly terrible law, and I’d like to
see it reined in. On the other
hand, Gundy may open up a nasty can of
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worms. The Supreme Court has deployed the
non-delegation doctrine to strike down
legislation precisely twice—in 1935. Both
laws were New Deal regulations: one
governing industrial labor laws, the other
setting quotas on oil sales. But shortly
thereafter,
the
court changed
its
attitude toward the New Deal, giving up
efforts to police economic reforms. Since
then, the court has largely abandoned the
nondelegation theory, allowing Congress to
delegate power to another branch so long
as that power is limited by some “intelligible
principle.”
Justice
Anthony
Kennedy described the
doctrine
as
“somewhat moribund” during oral arguments
in 2014.

Congress gives agencies a broad mandate to
interpret and implement these measures. If
the Supreme Court renders that mandate
unconstitutional, federal rules that protect
workers’ rights, collective bargaining, clean
air, and endangered species would fall.
So: Should progressives panic about Gundy?
Not quite yet. University of North Carolina
criminal law professor Carissa Byrne
Hessick points out that the Supreme Court
could set different rules for the nondelegation in the criminal context. Gorsuch
suggested as much in his 10th Circuit
opinion—which, in fact, involved a similar
challenge to SORNA’s retroactivity. In an
impressive dissent, Gorsuch wrote that
Congress must provide something more than
an “intelligible principle” when delegating
prosecutorial authority given the “individual
liberty” at stake. “If the separation of powers
means anything,” he asserted, “it must mean
that the prosecutor isn’t allowed to define the
crimes he gets to enforce.”

In recent years, however, several
conservative justices have expressed an
interest in reviving nondelegation principles.
Justice Clarence Thomas wants to bring it
back; so does Justice Neil Gorsuch,
who praised the doctrine as a safeguard of
personal freedom while on the 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals. (He also endorsed
it in a 2017 speech to the Federalist Society.)
Many progressives fear that, once
resuscitated, the theory could be used to
strike down all manner of economic
regulations.

I think Gorsuch is probably right, but I worry
about this court’s ability, or willingness, to
limit the non-delegation doctrine’s revival to
criminal cases. Gorsuch has a knack
for reintroducing conservative principles in
cases where they lead to a liberal outcome,
even though the underlying rationale tilts the
law rightward. Would this conservative
Supreme Court cabin non-delegation to
criminal law? Or might it succumb to the
temptation to use this principle as a sword to
slay
economic
and
environmental
regulations, too? Gundy will give us a
glimpse of the answer.

It’s a reasonable concern. These days,
Congress hands off most regulatory authority
to a slew of federal agencies situated in the
executive branch. A court concerned about
nondelegation could strike down a vast range
of liberal legislation under the doctrine.
Labor laws and environmental protections
would be especially vulnerable, since
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“Will Supreme Court push Congress to get back to its job of making law?”
The Hill
Mark Miller

June 4, 2018
In the Constitution, the opening phrase “We
the People” vests all legislative powers in
Congress. The power to write the federal
laws that govern the American people
belongs to Congress. The most important
protection of our liberty embedded in the
Constitution — the separation of powers
among the three branches of our federal
government — prohibits any branch from
redelegating its unique powers to another
branch. The courts call this the nondelegation
doctrine.

helps illustrate the constitutional problem.
While on federal supervised release related to
a drug charge, Herman Gundy was convicted
in state court of a sex offense. When he
completed his state prison sentence, the
government transferred him to a prison in
Pennsylvania on a different charge. While in
Pennsylvania he received permission to
travel to New York to serve time for that
crime in a halfway house. He did not,
however, register with the federal
government as a sex offender, as required
under the federal Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA) when a sex
offender crosses state lines.

However, Congress, with the Supreme
Court’s permission, has ignored that
prohibition by delegating its lawmaking
powers to executive agencies for more than
80 years. These agencies are staffed with
bureaucrats who can’t be voted out of office,
and many blame that lack of accountability
for the growth of the regulatory state in the
decades since the New Deal.

Although Gundy’s underlying crime
occurred prior to SORNA’s passage,
Congress included a provision allowing the
U.S. attorney general to decide if the law
would apply retroactively to offenders who
committed SORNA crimes before the law’s
passage. The attorney general decided it
would, issued a regulation that said as much,
and then charged Gundy for violating
SORNA when he crossed state lines without
registration.

But the Supreme Court has signaled it may
revoke its longstanding approval of the
administrative status quo. It recently granted
review of a criminal case, Gundy v. United
States, which will allow the court to limit
legislative powers to Congress, where they
belong.

Gundy challenged this conviction on a
number of grounds, but the Supreme Court
agreed to review the case for one reason: to
determine whether Congress’s use of

The facts of the criminal case are not the
central legal issue, but a brief explanation
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SORNA to delegate its lawmaking power to
the attorney general — regarding whether the
law should apply to criminals who committed
crimes before it was enacted — violates the
nondelegation doctrine.

wetland, and then conclude that a landowner
violated the Clean Water Act in years past.
Or, they narrow the definition of “normal
farming practices” by regulation and then
deny the statutory exemption to American
farmers for normal farming practices based
on practices conducted before the regulation
was finalized.

The court last struck down a statute for
violating the nondelegation doctrine in 1935.
The court’s acceptance of the Gundy case,
solely on this issue, signals a willingness to
revisit this doctrine and perhaps resurrect it.
In the case, the Supreme Court will decide
whether
Congress
overstepped
its
constitutional bounds by empowering the
attorney general to unilaterally make law.

And the voter cannot punish the writer of
these commands because Congress cleverly
has passed the lawmaking buck to
bureaucrats who cannot be voted out of
office. That is the rub — our Founding
Fathers delegated the lawmaking authority to
Congress, and then made legislators
responsible to the people by allowing the
people to vote them in or out of office every
two years, according to how Congress abused
or properly used its lawmaking power.

Although the nondelegation doctrine does not
prevent Congress from “obtaining the
assistance of its coordinate branches,” as the
court has said, it does require Congress to
minimally explain — by way of what the
court has called “an intelligible principle” —
what it wants the federal agency to do. But
unsurprisingly, Congress often fails to muster
any principle, intelligible or otherwise, to
explain what it expects the agency to do.

Congress insulates itself from this
accountability by shirking its lawmaking
responsibility and handing it off to
bureaucrats. The Supreme Court should use
the Gundy case to put a stop to this
purposeful avoidance of accountability.

Such is the case here. The attorney general’s
regulation applying SORNA’s registration
requirement retroactively to Gundy’s crimes
before the act’s passage may be a legitimate
decision, but it is a decision for Congress to
make, according to the Constitution.

To be clear: if Gundy wins his case, his
conviction for not registering under SORNA
would be reversed, but Congress would then
most likely amend the law to require
registration for old crimes. That puts the
lawmaking onus back on Congress where it
belongs. In reality, this case is less about
Gundy than it is about the Supreme Court
reining in the regulatory state run amok, and
requiring Congress to get back to doing its
job.

Like Gundy, American businesses face
retroactive applications of new regulatory
standards all the time. For example,
regulatory agencies reinterpret a broad
statutory term, such as what constitutes a
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“United States v. Gundy”
Justia
Justia Inc.

September 15, 2015
The Government appealed the district court's
dismissal of an indictment against defendant
and denial of its motion for reconsideration.
Defendant was indicted for violation of the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The
district court held that defendant did not
violate section 2250(a) because defendant
was not “required to register” until shortly
before his release from custody and thus after
the interstate travel charged in the
Indictment. The court reversed and

remanded, concluding that defendant was a
person “required to register” under SORNA
beginning at the latest on August 1, 2008, the
effective date of the Attorney General’s final
guidelines. This date arrived well before his
alleged travel from Pennsylvania to New
York. The district court thus erred in
concluding that defendant became a person
“required to register” under SORNA only
after traveling interstate.
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Nielsen v. Preap
Ruling Below: Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016)
Overview: Three lawful residents were taken into custody by immigration authorities and were
detained without bond hearings years after they completed serving their sentence for an offense
that could have led to their removal. As a result, a class action for habeas relief was filed. Preap
focuses on a federal law that allows the Department of Homeland Security to detain non-citizens
convicted of specified crimes until proceedings take place to deport them.
Issue: Whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. S
1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security
does not take him into immigration custody immediately.
Mony PREAP; Eduardo Vega Padilla; Juan Lozano Magdaleno, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department Of Homeland Security; Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney
General; Timothy S. Aitken; Gregory Archambeault; David Marin, Defendants-Appellants
United States District Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on August 4, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

which requires immigration authorities to
detain them “when [they are] released” from
criminal custody, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), and
to hold them without bond, 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(2). A broad range of crimes is
covered under the mandatory detention
provision, from serious felonies to
misdemeanor offenses involving moral
turpitude and simple possession of a
controlled substance. 8 U.S.C. §§
1226(c)(1)(A)–(D).

Every day in the United States, the
government holds over 30,000 aliens in
prison-like conditions while determining
whether they should be removed from the
country. Some are held because they were
found, in a bond hearing, to pose a risk of
flight or dangerousness. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Others, however, are
held without bond because they have
committed an offense enumerated in a
provision of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c). Aliens in this latter group are subject
to the INA’s mandatory detention provision,

This mandatory detention provision
has been challenged on various grounds. See,
e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513
(2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the
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that “an alien described in paragraph (1)” is
any alien who commits a crime listed in §§
1226(c)(1)(A)– (D) regardless of how much
time elapses between criminal custody and
immigration custody. According to the
government, individuals not detained “when
. . . released” from criminal custody as
required by paragraph (1) are still considered
“alien[s] described in paragraph (1)” for
purposes of the bar to bonded release in
paragraph (2).

provision against a due process challenge);
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078–
81 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez III), cert.
granted sub nom., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No.
15-1204, 2016 WL 1182403 (June 20, 2016)
(holding that detainees are entitled to a bond
hearing after spending six months in
custody). Here, we are faced with another
such challenge; this time, regarding the
meaning of the phrase “when [they are]
released” in § 1226(c)(1), and whether it
limits the category of aliens subject to
detention without bond under § 1226(c)(2).
Specifically, we must decide whether an alien
must be detained without bond even if he has
resettled into the community after release
from criminal custody. If the answer is no,
then the alien may still be detained, but he
may seek release in a bond hearing under §
1226(a) by showing that he poses neither a
risk of flight nor a danger to the community.
Addressing this issue requires us to consider
the interaction of the two paragraphs of the
mandatory detention provision, 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c). Paragraph (1) requires the Attorney
General (“AG”) to “take into custody any
alien who [commits an offense enumerated in
subparagraphs (A)– (D)] when the alien is
released [from criminal custody].” 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1). Paragraph (2) prohibits the
release of “an alien described in paragraph
(1)” except in limited circumstances
concerning witness protection. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the phrase
“when . . . released” in paragraph (1) applies
to paragraph (2) as well, so that an alien must
be held without bond only if taken into
immigration custody promptly upon release
from criminal custody for an enumerated
offense. The government, by contrast, argues

To date, five of our sister circuits
have considered this issue, and four have
sided with the government. Significantly,
however, there is no consensus in the
reasoning of these courts. The Second and
Tenth Circuits found that the phrase “an alien
described in paragraph (1)” was ambiguous,
and thus deferred to the BIA’s interpretation
of the phrase to mean “an alien described in
subparagraphs (A)–(D) of paragraph (1).”
See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 612 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“Consistent with Chevron, we are
not convinced that the interpretation is
‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute.’” (quoting Adams v. Holder,
692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012))); Olmos v.
Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“The text, the statutory clues, and canons of
interpretation do not definitively clarify the
meaning of § 1226(c).”). The Fourth Circuit
has held that “when . . . released” means any
time after release, but it did so under a
misconception that the BIA
had so
interpreted the phrase. Hosh v. Lucero, 680
F.3d 375, 380–81 (4th Cir. 2012). Finally, the
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits applied the
loss-of-authority rule, finding that the AG’s
duty to detain criminal aliens under §
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1226(c)(1) continues even if the government
fails to comply with the “when . . . released”
condition. See, e.g., Sylvain v. Atty Gen. of
United States, 714 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding that “[e]ven if the statute calls
for detention ‘when the alien is released,’ and
even if ‘when’ implies something less than
four years, nothing in the statute suggests that
immigration officials lose authority if they
delay”); see also Lora, 804 F.3d at 612;
Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1325–26.

I.
The named Plaintiffs in this case are
lawful permanent residents who have
committed a crime that could lead to removal
from the United States. Plaintiffs served their
criminal sentences and, upon release,
returned to their families and communities.
Years later, immigration authorities took
them into custody and detained them without
bond hearings under § 1226(c). Plaintiffs
argue that because they were not detained
“when . . . released” from criminal custody,
they were not subject to mandatory detention
under § 1226(c).

On the other hand, the government’s
position has been rejected by most district
courts to consider the question and, most
recently, by three of six judges sitting en banc
in the First Circuit. See Castañeda v. Souza,
810 F.3d 15, 18–43 (1st Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(Barron, J.). In an opinion written by Judge
Barron, these three judges concluded that the
statutory context and legislative history make
clear that aliens can be held without bond
under § 1226(c)(2) only if taken into
immigration custody pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)
“when . . . released” from criminal custody,
not if there is a lengthy gap after their release.
See id. at 36, 38.

Mony Preap, born in a refugee camp
after his family fled Cambodia’s Khmer
Rouge, has been a lawful permanent resident
of the United States since 1981, when he
immigrated here as an infant. He has two
2006
misdemeanor
convictions
for
possession of marijuana. Years after being
released at the end of his sentences for these
convictions, Preap was transferred to
immigration detention upon serving a short
sentence for simple battery (an offense not
covered by the mandatory detention statute)
and held without a bond hearing. Since the
instant litigation began, Preap has been
granted cancellation of removal and released
from immigration custody.

We agree with Judge Barron and his
two colleagues. The statute unambiguously
imposes mandatory detention without bond
only on those aliens taken by the AG into
immigration custody “when [they are]
released” from criminal custody. And
because Congress’s use of the word “when”
conveys immediacy, we conclude that the
immigration detention must occur promptly
upon the aliens’ release from criminal
custody.

Eduardo Vega Padilla has been a
lawful permanent resident since 1966, shortly
after he came to the United States as an
infant. Padilla also has two drug possession
convictions—one from 1997 and one from
1999—and a 2002 conviction for owning a
firearm with a prior felony conviction.
Eleven years after finishing his sentence on
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that last conviction, he was placed in removal
proceedings and held in mandatory detention.
Padilla eventually obtained release after
receiving a bond hearing under our decision
in Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715
F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013), in which we
held that the government’s detention
authority shifts from § 1226(c) to § 1226(a)
after a detainee has spent six months in
custody; Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d
1060, 1078–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez
III), cert. granted sub nom., Jennings v.
Rodriguez, No. 15- 1204, 2016 WL 1182403
(June 20, 2016).

custody by the government immediately
upon their release from criminal custody for
a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The district
court also issued a preliminary injunction
requiring the government to provide all class
members with bond hearings under §
1226(a). Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D. 566,
571, 584 (N.D. Cal. 2014). This appeal
followed.

II.
We have jurisdiction to review this
class action habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. The jurisdiction-stripping provision
of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), which bars judicial
review of discretionary agency decisions
regarding immigrant detention, does not bar
us from hearing “challenges [to] the statutory
framework that permits [petitioners’]
detention without bail.” Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003). We review questions
of statutory construction de novo. United
States v. Bert, 292 F.3d 649, 651 (9th Cir.
2002).

Juan Lozano Magdaleno has been a
lawful permanent resident since he
immigrated to the United States as a teenager
in 1974. Magdaleno has a 2000 conviction
for owning a firearm with a prior felony
conviction, and a 2007 conviction for simple
possession of a controlled substance. He was
sentenced to six months on the possession
charge and released from jail in January
2008. Over five years later, Magdaleno was
taken into immigration custody and held
without bond pursuant to § 1226(c). He also
was later released from detention following a
Rodriguez hearing.

III.
The government’s authority to detain
immigrants in removal proceedings arises
from two primary statutory sources.8 The
first, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), grants the AG
discretion to arrest and detain any alien upon
the initiation of removal proceedings.9 Under
this provision, the AG may then choose to
keep the alien in detention, or allow release
on conditional parole or bond. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(1)–(2).

These three Plaintiffs filed a class
action petition for habeas relief in the
Northern District of California. The district
court granted their motion for class
certification, certifying a class of all
“[i]ndividuals in the state of California who
are or will be subjected to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and
who were not or will not have been taken into
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If the AG opts for detention, the alien
may seek review of that decision at a hearing
before an immigration judge (“IJ”), 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.1(d)(1), who may overrule the AG and
grant release on bond, id. § 1003.19. The
alien bears the burden of proving his
suitability for release, and the IJ should
consider whether he “is a threat to national
security, a danger to the community at large,
likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail
risk.” Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37,
40 (BIA 2006); see also 8 § C.F.R.
1236.1(c)(8).

containing conditions prescribed
by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(c) Detention of criminal aliens
(1) Custody
The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien who –

The second provision is 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), the mandatory detention provision
at issue in this case. Importantly, this
provision operates as a limited exception to §
1226(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (“Except as
provided in subsection (c) of this section . .
.”). Section 1226(c) reads as follows:

(A) is inadmissible by reason
of having committed any
offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of
having committed any
offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of
this title,

(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General,
an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States. Except as
provided in subsection (c) of this section and
pending such decision, the Attorney
General–

(C) is
deportable
under
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)
of this title on the basis of
an offense for which the
alien has been sentence
[sic] to a term of
imprisonment of at least 1
year, or

(1) may continue to detain the
arrested alien; and

(D) is inadmissible under
section 1182(a)(3)(B) of
this title or deportable
under
section
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title

(2) may release the alien on–
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with
security approved by, and
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when the alien is released, without
regard to whether the alien is released
on parole, supervised release, or
probation, and without regard to
whether the alien may be arrested or
imprisoned again for the same
offense.

thus subjecting all criminal aliens who have
committed one of the listed crimes to
mandatory detention regardless of when they
were taken into immigration custody. See In
re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 121 (BIA
2001). Second, the government argues that
we should follow the Fourth Circuit in
holding that “when . . . released” is a dutytriggering clause, not a time-limiting clause,
and that, as such, it merely informs the AG
when the duty to detain arises, not when the
duty must be performed. Hosh v. Lucero, 680
F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2012). Third, the
government argues that we should follow the
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits in holding
that, even if Congress intended that
immigration authorities promptly detain
criminal aliens when they are released from
criminal custody, Congress did not clearly
intend that they would lose the authority to do
so in the event of delay.

(2) Release
The Attorney General may
release an alien described in
paragraph (1) only if the Attorney
General decides pursuant to [the
Federal
Witness
Protection
Program] that release of the alien
from custody is necessary . . .
[and] the alien will not pose a
danger to . . . safety . . . and is
likely to appear for any scheduled
proceeding.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (emphases added)
(footnote omitted). We must decide the
proper scope of this mandatory detention
exception, and specifically whether it applies
to aliens who are not promptly placed in
removal proceedings upon their release from
criminal custody for an offense listed in §
1226(c)(1)(A)–(D).

We find all three arguments
unpersuasive. We agree with Judge Barron
and his colleagues on the First Circuit in
Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 19, that the
government’s positions contradict the intent
of Congress expressed through the language
and structure of the statute.
A.

The government advances three
arguments to support its view that Plaintiffs
are subject to mandatory detention under §
1226(c). First, it argues that we should give
Chevron deference, as have the Second and
Tenth Circuits, to the BIA’s interpretation
that the phrase “an alien described in
Paragraph (1)” means “an alien described in
subparagraphs (A)–(D) of paragraph (1),”

We first address the government’s
argument that we should defer to the BIA’s
interpretation of § 1226(c)(2)’s phrase “an
alien described in paragraph (1)” to mean “an
alien described in subparagraphs (A)–(D) of
paragraph (1).” See Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
125 (“We construe the phrasing ‘an alien
described in paragraph (1),’ as including only
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those aliens described in subparagraphs (A)
through (D) of section [(c)(1)], and as not
including the ‘when released’ clause.”).
Under this interpretation, § 1226(c)(2)’s
detention-without-bond requirement applies
to any alien who has committed an offense
enumerated in § 1226(c)(1), regardless of
how long after release from criminal custody
he or she was taken into immigration
custody. This interpretation is at odds with
the statute, which unambiguously links the
“when . . . released” custody instruction in §
1226(c)(1) to the without-bond instruction in
§ 1226(c)(2), such that the latter applies only
after the former is satisfied.

Starting with the text, we find that §
1226(c)(2) is straightforward. It refers simply
to “an alien described in paragraph (1),” not
to “an alien described in subparagraphs
(1)(A)–(D).” We must presume that
Congress selected its language deliberately,
thus intending that “an alien described in
paragraph (1)” is just that—i.e. an alien who
committed a covered offense and who was
taken into immigration custody “when . . .
released.” See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 964 v. BF
Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructurers Grp.,
387 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there.” (quoting Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–
54 (1992))). Certainly, had Congress wanted
to refer only to “an alien described in
subparagraphs (A)–(D),” it could have done
so. And while we recognize that “Congress
has not always been consistent in how it
refers to other subsections in the same
statute,” Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1320 (describing
a separate provision where Congress referred
to “subparagraph (a)” but the context made it
obvious that Congress was referring to only
subparts (i) and (ii)), we observe that, unlike
the example cited by the Third Circuit in
Olmos, this section’s context supports, rather
than contradicts, the plain meaning.

When faced with a question of
statutory interpretation, our analysis begins
“with the text of the statute.” Yokeno v.
Sekiguchi, 754 F.3d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2014).
The words of a statute should be accorded
their plain meaning, as considered in light of
“the particular statutory language at issue, as
well as the language and design of the statute
as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). We cannot look to
the statute’s language in isolation because
“[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain
words or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context.” FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
132 (2000). “If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously
expressed
intent
of
Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).

As mentioned, there are two relevant
sources of authority for the government’s
detention of aliens in removal proceedings—
§ 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Section 1226(a)
provides for discretionary detention of any
alien in removal proceedings, while §
1226(c) provides a limited exception of
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the AG can fail to comply with the “when . .
. released” requirement of § 1226(c)(1)—
thereby necessarily relying on § 1226(a) for
its authority to take custody of an alien—but
still apply the release conditions of §
1226(c)(2). In other words, even if §
1226(c)(1) authorizes the custody of only
those aliens who are detained “when [they
are] released” from criminal custody, not
those who are detained at a later time, the
BIA would still apply § 1226(c)(2)’s
proscription on bonded release from
immigration custody. This reading simply
fails to do justice to the statute’s structure.
See Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 26 (noting that
under the BIA’s reading, the statute is “oddly
misaligned” because it necessarily “delink[s] the ‘Custody’ directive in §
1226(c)(1) from the bar to ‘Release’ in
(c)(2)”).

mandatory detention for a specified group of
aliens. Thus, if the government is not
authorized to detain an alien under the narrow
exception of § 1226(c), it may only do so
under the general rule of § 1226(a).
Critically, however, each of these sections
includes its own corresponding instructions
for releasing detained aliens—§ 1226(a)
provides for possible release on bond, while
§ 1226(c) forbids any release except under
special circumstances concerning witness
protection. There is one important
consequence of this structure: under both the
general detention provision in § 1226(a) and
the mandatory detention provision in §
1226(c), the authority to detain and the
authority to release go hand in hand. That is,
an alien detained under § 1226(a) is clearly
subject to the release provisions of § 1226(a),
whereas one detained under § 1226(c) is
subject to the release provisions in § 1226(c).
Accordingly, if an alien is not detained in
immigration custody “when . . . released”
from criminal custody, as required under §
1226(c)(2), then the government derives its
sole authority to detain that alien from §
1226(a)(1), and, as a consequence, it must
provide the alien with a bond hearing as
required under § 1226(a)(2).

The headings in § 1226(c) further
illustrate this point. Section 1226(c) as a
whole is entitled “Detention of criminal
aliens.” This heading conveys to the reader
that the section provides an exception to the
general detention rule of § 1226(a), and that
this exception concerns the detention of
certain criminal aliens. The two paragraphs
within the section are entitled “Custody” and
“Release.” These headings inform the reader
that the section governs the full life cycle of
the criminal aliens’ detention, with the first
paragraph specifying the requirements for
taking them into custody, and the second
specifying the restrictions on their release.
This structure suggests only one logical
conclusion: the release provisions of §
1226(c)(2) come into effect only after the
government takes a criminal alien into

The BIA’s interpretation in In re
Rojas flouts this structure. The BIA held that
the “when . . . released” clause was
“address[ed] . . . to the statutory command
that the ‘Attorney General shall take into
custody’ certain categories of aliens,” but that
it did not define the categories of aliens
subject to the prohibition on bonded release
in § 1226(c)(2). In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 121. The BIA thereby held, in essence, that
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custody according to § 1226(c)(1). And,
correspondingly, if the government fails to
take an alien into custody according to §
1226(c)(1), then it necessarily may do so only
under the general detention provision of §
1226(a), and we never reach the release
restrictions in § 1226(c)(2).

1226(c) in order for paragraph (2) to take
effect. Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1321 (recognizing
that the authority to detain “arises in
Paragraph ‘1’” and that “the [AG] must
exercise this responsibility ‘when the alien is
released’”). But, applying the loss-ofauthority doctrine, that court concluded that
the government maintains its authority to
take custody of an alien under § 1226(c)(1)
even when it fails to comply with the “when
. . . released” requirement. Olmos, 780 F.3d
at 1321–22 (“With the alien in the [AG’s]
custody under his delayed enforcement of §
1226(c)(1), there would be nothing odd about
§ 1226(c)(2)’s restrictions on when the alien
can be released.”). Finding that the “when . .
. released” requirement imposed no actual
limitations on the government, the Tenth
Circuit thus concluded that the BIA’s
interpretation—reading out the “when . . .
released” requirement—was reasonable. Id.
We disagree. As we later explain, the loss-ofauthority doctrine does not apply to §
1226(c). And absent this doctrine, we are left
with the conclusion that the AG must comply
with § 1226(c)(1), including the “when . . .
released” requirement, before it can apply §
1226(c)(2).

Rojas’s contrary reading, as Judge
Barron explained, would mean that Congress
directed the AG to hold without bond aliens
“who had never been in criminal custody”—
because with the “when . . . released” clause
rendered inoperative for purposes of §
1226(c)(2), there would be nothing to impose
a requirement of the aliens ever having been
in custody. Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 27. At the
same time, Rojas’s reading would leave the
AG “complete discretion to decide not to take
[such aliens] into immigration custody at all.”
Id. These incongruous consequences further
persuade us to reject the BIA’s reading.
Notably, neither the BIA nor those
circuits that deferred to the BIA adequately
addressed the structure of the relationship
between § 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Indeed, the
BIA and the Second Circuit failed to address
it at all. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601,
611 (2d Cir. 2015) (deeming it ambiguous
whether the “when . . . released” clause “is
part of the definition of aliens subject to
mandatory detention” without considering
statutory context); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N.
Dec. at 121–22 (considering statutory context
but failing to acknowledge the relationship
between § 1226(a) and § 1226(c)). The Tenth
Circuit did address it, and even seemed to
agree with our conclusion that custody must
be authorized under paragraph (1) of §

In sum, we conclude that paragraph
(2)’s limitations on release unambiguously
depend upon paragraph (1)’s mandate to take
custody. “An alien described in paragraph
(1)” is therefore one who is detained
according to the requirements of paragraph
(1). These requirements include the mandate
that the government take the alien into
custody “when . . . released.” The BIA’s
interpretation
to
the
contrary
is
impermissible.
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thing that leaps out is that “Congress chose a
word, ‘when,’ that naturally conveys some
degree of immediacy as opposed to a purely
conditional word, such as ‘if.’” Castañeda,
810 F.3d at 37 (citation omitted). Of course,
the word “when” has multiple dictionary
definitions. But looking to context, which of
these meanings is the intended one is clear.
The word “when” used in a command such as
this one requires prompt action. Consider a
teacher’s common instruction to stop writing
when the exam ends. There is no doubt that
such an instruction requires the student to
immediately stop writing at the end of the
exam period. Or as one district court noted,
“if a wife tells her husband to pick up the kids
when they finish school, implicit in this
command . . . is the expectation that the
husband is waiting at the moment” school
ends. Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 1136, 1155 (D. Colo. 2013); see
also Khoury v. Asher, 3 F. Supp. 3d 877, 887
(W.D. Wash. 2014) (“A mandate is
meaningless if those subject to it can carry it
out whenever they please.”). Similarly, the
use of the phrase “when . . . released,” when
paired with the directive to detain,
unambiguously requires detention with
“some degree of immediacy.” Hosh v.
Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2012).

B.
We must next decide whether the AG
is in compliance with § 1226(c)(1)’s custody
mandate—and
thus
§
1226(c)(2)’s
limitations on release apply—even if the AG
takes an alien into custody after substantial
time has passed since the alien’s release from
criminal custody. Plaintiffs argue that §
1226(c)(1)’s mandate requiring the AG to
detain criminal aliens “when [they are]
released” from criminal custody means that
they must be taken into custody promptly
after release, not years later, as were the
named Plaintiffs here. The government, on
the other hand, argues that the phrase “when
. . . released” is ambiguous, supporting either
Plaintiffs’ reading or a broader reading
requiring mandatory detention of any
criminal alien arrested by the AG at any point
after release from criminal custody. The
government’s argument wrongly assumes
that the BIA had so construed “when . . .
released.” On the contrary, the BIA explicitly
stated that “[t]he statute does direct the [AG]
to take custody of aliens immediately upon
their release from criminal confinement.”
Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 122 (emphasis
added). And even if the BIA had construed
the phrase not to require immediate
confinement, the statute would foreclose that
construction because “when . . . released”
unambiguously requires promptness.

Indeed, “[i]f Congress really meant
for the duty in (c)(1) to take effect ‘in the
event of’ or ‘any time after’ an alien’s release
from criminal custody, we would expect
Congress to have said so, given that it spoke
with just such directness elsewhere in the
IIRIRA.” Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 38 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“[T]he alien shall be
removed under the prior order at any time

Again, we start with the plain
language: “The Attorney General shall take
into custody any alien who [commits an
enumerated offense] when the alien is
released [from criminal custody].” 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c). As Judge Barron observed, the first
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after the reentry.” (emphasis added)); see
also Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp.
2d 1221, 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting
that Congress “easily could have used the
language ‘after the alien is released,’
‘regardless of when the alien is released,’ or
other words to that effect”). But instead
Congress chose words that signal an
expectation of immediate action. See Jones v.
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999)
(“Statutory language must be read in context
[as] a phrase ‘gathers meaning from the
words around it.’” (quoting Jarecki v. G. D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))).
This word choice must be given its due
weight.

once justified mandatory detention are still
present. These considerations are prudently
reflected in Congress’s decision that these
individuals must be detained “when . . .
released,” and that if they aren’t, the AG may
detain them only if warranted under the
general detention provision of 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a), upon a bond hearing during which
an individualized assessment of risks is
conducted. We therefore conclude that the
phrase “when . . . released” connotes some
degree of immediacy.
C.
Finally, we turn to the government’s
argument that even if § 1226(c)(1)
unambiguously requires prompt detention,
we should nonetheless uphold the AG’s
authority to detain without bond an alien who
committed a covered offense even when the
AG has violated the mandate of § 1226(c)(1).
The government points to a line of cases
holding that: “[i]f a statute does not specify a
consequence for noncompliance with
statutory timing provisions, the federal courts
will not in the ordinary course impose their
own coercive sanction.” Barnhart v. Peabody
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 (2003) (quoting
United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)); see also
id. at 158 (“Nor, since Brock [v. Pierce
County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986)], have we ever
construed a provision that the government
‘shall’ act within a specified time, without
more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding
action later.”); United States v. Nashville, C
& St. L. Ry., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886);
United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1027
(10th Cir. 2009). Under this “loss-of-

Moreover, unlike the government’s
interpretation, our reading is consistent with
Congress’s purposes in enacting the
mandatory detention provision—to address
heightened risks of flight and dangerousness
associated with aliens who commit certain
crimes, which are serious enough to give rise
to criminal custody. See Demore, 538 U.S. at
518–19 (describing evidence before
Congress). These purposes are ill-served
when the critical link between criminal
detention and immigration detention is
broken and the alien is set free for long
stretches of time. Congress’s concerns over
flight and dangerousness are most
pronounced at the point when the criminal
alien is released. Consequently, we can be
certain that Congress did not intend to
authorize delays in the detention of these
criminal aliens. And correspondingly,
without considering the aliens’ conduct in
any intervening period of freedom, it is
impossible to conclude that the risks that
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authority” line of cases, the government’s
argument goes, the AG’s failure to timely
take into custody a criminal alien in no way
affects her ability to act pursuant to the
mandatory detention provision of §
1226(c)(2). Several circuits have agreed. See
Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 157; Lora, 804 F.3d at
612– 13; Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1324–26.

this decision, our sister circuits have treated
Montalvo-Murillo as a “close[] analog” to the
dispute over § 1226(c)’s limitations. Sylvain,
714 F.3d at 158. We find, however, that
Montalvo-Murillo is readily distinguishable.
Critically, unlike in MontalvoMurillo, the government here invokes the
loss-of-authority doctrine to justify extending
a statutory provision that in fact curtails,
rather than expands, the government’s
discretionary authority. See Farrin R. Anello,
Due Process and Temporal Limits on
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65
Hastings L. J. 363, 367 (2014) (“The
[mandatory detention provision] strips the
immigration judge of her power to conduct a
bond hearing and decide whether the
individual poses any danger or flight risk, and
likewise precludes DHS from making
discretionary judgments about whether
detention is appropriate.”). Indeed, the sole
practical effect of the district court’s decision
in this case is to reinstate the government’s
general authority, under § 1226(a), to decline
to detain, or to release on bond, those
criminal aliens who are not timely detained
under § 1226(c). In short, we decline to apply
the loss-of-authority doctrine where, as here,
there is no loss of authority.

The courts adopting this reasoning
rely on United States v. Montalvo-Murillo,
495 U.S. 711 (1990), in which the Supreme
Court interpreted a provision of the Bail
Reform Act that required judicial officers to
hold a bond hearing “immediately upon the
[defendant]’s first appearance before the
judicial officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2).
Montalvo-Murillo didn’t receive a timely
hearing under this provision, and the district
court released him from custody. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a
failure to comply with the first appearance
requirement
does
not
defeat
the
government’s authority to seek detention of
the person charged.” 495 U.S. at 717. The
Court noted that nowhere did the statute
provide for the release of pretrial detainees as
a remedy for the failure by judicial officers to
provide prompt hearings. Id. And it
concluded
that
“[a]utomatic
release
contravene[d] the object of the statute, to
provide fair bail procedures while protecting
the safety of the public and assuring the
appearance . . . of defendants . . . .” Id. at 719.
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would
“bestow upon the defendant a windfall” and
impose on the public “a severe penalty” by
“mandating release of possibly dangerous
defendants every time some deviation” from
the statute occurred. Id. at 720. Looking to

Moreover, unlike the district court’s
ruling in Montalvo-Murillo, our holding does
not craft a new remedy inconsistent with the
statutory scheme. Whereas in MontalvoMurillo the statute at issue did not identify a
remedy for a delayed hearing, see United
States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 876 F.2d 826,
831 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (noting that
“Congress did not provide . . . the remedy”
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for a violation of § 3142(f)), overruled by
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 722), here the
statutory structure makes clear precisely what
occurs in the absence of prompt detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c): the general
detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
applies.
Far
from
imposing
a
judiciallycreated remedy for untimely
detention, we are merely holding that under
the statute, the conditions for the mandatory
detention exception are not met when
detention is too long delayed. See Castañeda,
810 F.3d at 40–41 (distinguishing several
cases where courts improperly fashioned
their own sanctions).

reserved for those aliens who pose the
greatest risks.
We therefore hold that the mandatory
detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
applies only to those criminal aliens who are
detained promptly after their release from
criminal custody, not to those detained long
after.
IV.
In so holding, we are not suggesting
that the mandate to detain “when . . .
released” necessarily requires detention to
occur at the exact moment an alien leaves
criminal custody. The plain meaning of
“when . . . released” in this context suggests
that apprehension must occur with a
reasonable degree of immediacy. Accord
Hosh, 680 F.3d at 381 (“[W]e agree that
Congress’s command . . . connotes some
degree of immediacy . . . .”); Rojas, 23 I. &
N. Dec. at 122 (“The statute does direct the
[AG] to take custody of aliens immediately
upon
their
release
from
criminal
confinement.”). Thus, depending on the
circumstances of an individual case, an alien
may be detained “when . . . released” even if
immigration authorities take a very short
period of time to bring the alien into custody.

We do not share the Third Circuit’s
concern that failing to apply the loss-ofauthority doctrine “would lead to an outcome
contrary to the statute’s design: a dangerous
alien would be eligible for a hearing—which
could lead to his release—merely because an
official missed the deadline.” Sylvain, 714
F.3d at 160. Congress’s design of protecting
the public by detaining criminal aliens is
undoubtedly premised on the notion that
recently released criminal aliens may be
presumed a risk. Such a presumption carries
considerably less force when these aliens live
free and productive lives after serving their
criminal sentences. See Saysana v. Gillen,
590 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2009) (“By any
logic, it stands to reason that the more remote
in time a conviction becomes and the more
time after a conviction an individual spends
in a community, the lower his bail risk is
likely to be.”). Indeed, the imposition of
robotic detention procedures in such cases
not only smacks of injustice, but also drains
scarce detention resources that should be

This appeal, however, does not
present the question exactly how quickly
detention must occur to satisfy the “when . . .
released” requirement. The class was defined
as those who were not “immediately
detained” but were still taken into mandatory
custody, and the government did not
challenge the class definition on the ground
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class of aliens who were not “immediately
detained” when released from criminal
custody, and that grant of relief accords with
our interpretation of the statutory
requirements.

that it required further clarification as to the
meaning of “immediately.” Nor did the
government appeal class certification on the
ground that the named class members were
not typical of the class as a whole—even
though the named Plaintiffs spent years in
their home communities after completing
their criminal sentences, whereas some class
members presumably were released for
shorter times. We thus need not decide for
purposes of the instant appeal exactly how
promptly an alien must be brought into
immigration custody after being released
from criminal custody for the transition to be
immediate enough to satisfy the “when . . .
released” requirement. The district court
granted preliminary injunctive relief to a

*

*

*

Under the plain language of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), the government may detain
without a bond hearing only those criminal
aliens it takes into immigration custody
promptly upon their release from triggering
criminal custody.
AFFIRMED.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Immigrants Jailed For Past Crimes Can Be
Detained Pending Deportation”

The Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage

March 19, 2018
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide
another
case
testing
the
Trump
administration's power to arrest and jail
immigrants facing deportation, including
longtime lawful residents who committed
minor offenses years ago.

The case, to be heard in the fall, sets up
another clash between "sanctuary" cities and
counties and federal immigration agents who
seek to detain and deport immigrants who
have criminal records.

The justices will review a class-action ruling
from California that held that immigrants
who were released after serving time in local
and state jails may not be detained later by
federal immigration agents for possible
deportation and held indefinitely without a
hearing, if they pose no danger to the public
and are not likely to flee.
Administration lawyers appealed the ruling
of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that federal law calls for "mandatory
detention" for all noncitizens who face
possible deportation because of a criminal
record.

In deciding the case, the 9th Circuit said that
more 30,000 non-citizens are held every day
in the United States in "prison-like
conditions" while they challenge the
government's efforts to deport them. The
judges said the mandatory-detention rule
covers those with a "broad range of crimes"
on their records, from violent felonies to
simple drug possession. And it applies to
longtime, lawful residents who have lived
and worked in the United States for decades,
they said.

They said the 9th Circuit's approach would
lead to a "gap in custody" and "frustrate the
[government's] ability to remove deportable
criminal aliens from the United States." And
they placed part of the blame on "state and
local jurisdictions [that] do not always
cooperate" with federal efforts to arrest
immigrants who are leaving jails.

The lead plaintiff in the challenge to this
provision, Mony Preap, was born in a
Cambodian refugee camp and has been a
lawful permanent resident since 1981. He
was convicted on two counts of marijuana
possession in 2006, a misdemeanor offense.
Agents of the Department of Homeland
Security took him into custody in 2013 under
the disputed part of the immigration law,
which says the DHS "shall take into custody
399

any alien" who was convicted of a
"deportable" offense "when the alien is
released."

on a different group of lawful immigrants
who had served jail time for a criminal
offense.

Preap joined a class-action suit brought by
the American Civil Liberties Union to
challenge the government's view that he was
subject to mandatory detention seven years
after his release. A federal judge in San
Francisco and the 9th Circuit agreed with the
challengers and said the phrase "when the
alien is released" referred only to the time of
their release. Because Preap had been
released years earlier, he was not subject to
mandatory detention in 2013 for the past
offenses, the appeals court said.

Lawyers for Preap and the other plaintiffs in
the case had urged the court to turn down the
administration's appeal. "Instead of focusing
mandatory detention on high-risk individuals
who are coming out of criminal custody, the
government's expansive interpretation would
sweep up individuals who have been living
peaceably in the community for more than a
decade and pose neither a danger nor a flight
risk," they said.
They cited a second plaintiff, Eduardo Vega
Padilla, who came to the United States as a
toddler and has been a lawful permanent
resident since 1966. He was convicted of
drug possession in 1997 and for keeping an
unloaded pistol in a shed behind his house.
He served six months in jail, but was arrested
11 years later under the mandatory-detention
provision of the federal law. Padilla was later
released on bond because he posed no flight
risk.

"We therefore hold that the mandatory
detention provision … applies only to those
criminal aliens who are detained promptly
after their release from criminal custody, not
to those detained long after," wrote Judge
Jacqueline Nguyen.
The Supreme Court kept the government's
appeal on hold while it decided a related case.
In Jennings vs. Rodriguez, the court ruled last
month that federal law did not give jailed
immigrants a right to a bail hearing after six
months in custody. However, the justices sent
that case back to the 9th Circuit to rule on
whether indefinite detention without a
hearing violated the Constitution.

Preap was released after winning his fight
against deportation.
But the Supreme Court said it would hear the
case of Nielsen vs. Preap in the fall to decide
whether federal law requires mandatory
detention for all non-citizens who have past
crimes that could trigger their deportation.

The new case, Nielsen vs. Preap, concerns a
part of the same immigration law but focuses
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“Supreme Court to Consider How Fast Government Must Act in Detaining
Immigrants For Deportation”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes

March 19, 2018
There is a split in the lower courts on whether
federal officials must act immediately after
the person is released from criminal custody
to detain them indefinitely as they await
deportation proceedings. The case will be
heard in the term that begins in October.

with President Trump’s vow to remove more
noncitizens who have committed crimes that
make them deportable.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
said that unless the arrest is prompt, the
detainee should receive a hearing to
determine whether they may be freed
awaiting the outcome of the deportation
proceedings. Immigrants would have to
convince an immigration judge that they
posed no danger to others and were not a
flight risk.

Mony Preap was born in a refugee camp after
his parents fled Cambodia, and he has lived
legally in the United States since 1981. He
was convicted in 2006 of marijuana
possession, but was not picked up by federal
authorities after he was sentenced to time
served.

The 9th Circuit case involved two people in
unrelated cases.

He served another criminal sentence for
battery in 2013, a charge that is not a
deportable offense. He was detained for
months, but was released and no longer faces
deportation.

Other lower courts have agreed with the
government’s reading that detention is
mandatory no matter when the noncitizen is
picked up.
The government argues that the 9th Circuit’s
approach will lead to a “gap in custody” and
hamper the federal government’s ability to
remove deportable immigrants. The Trump
administration said the efforts of “sanctuary
cities” reluctant to cooperate with federal
authorities escalate the difficulties.

Bassam Yusuf Khoury has been a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since
1976. In 2011, he was released after serving
a 30-day sentence for a drug charge. Nearly
two years later, federal authorities picked him
up for deportation and he was detained for
more than six months before a judge said he
could be released

The Obama administration took the same
reading of the law, but the stakes are higher

The issue concerns language in the federal
law that authorizes the Department of
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Homeland Security to seize someone for
deportation “when the alien is released” from
criminal custody.

more than a decade earlier, and who therefore
have an actual record of living at liberty in the
community without posing any flight risk or
danger to others.”

The federal government says it could mean
any time after the release, not just
immediately after the release.

The court decided a related case last month.
On a 5-to-3 vote, the court said federal law
did not require a bond hearing even after
months or years of detention of those facing
deportation.

Lawyers for the detainees say that under the
government’s reading, that would impose
mandatory deportation “on individuals who
have been released months, years, or even

The case to be heard is Nielsen v. Preap.
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“More Detained Immigrants Are Owed Bond Hearings: 9th Circ.”
Law360
Allissa Wickham

August 5, 2016
Only criminally convicted immigrants who
enter immigration custody soon after being
released from criminal custody can be
detained without bond hearings, the Ninth
Circuit decided Thursday in a ruling that also
upheld a lower court’s class certification in
the case.

were challenging their detention without
bond. The lower court granted the
petitioners’ motion for class certification and
issued an injunction forcing the government
to hold bond hearings for all the class
members, according to the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling.

A three-judge appellate panel ruled that a
mandatory detention section of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act applies
exclusively to immigrants who were detained
“promptly” after being let out of criminal
custody, not to people who were detained
much later.

The Ninth Circuit panel upheld the lower
court’s class certification ruling and the
preliminary injunction. According to Keker
& Van Nest LLP, which served as co-counsel
for the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling
means that “thousands” of immigrants in
California can now make a case against being
detained.

“The statute unambiguously imposes
mandatory detention without bond only on
those aliens taken by the [Attorney General]
into immigration custody ‘when [they are]
released’ from criminal custody,” wrote
Circuit Judge Jacqueline Nguyen. “And
because Congress’s use of the word ‘when’
conveys immediacy, we conclude that the
immigration detention must occur promptly
upon the aliens’ release from criminal
custody.”

“The Court specifically struck down the
government’s practice of subjecting
immigrants to mandatory detention based on
crimes they may have committed years ago,
even if those individuals had long since
rehabilitated themselves,” the firm said in a
statement.
Michael Tan, a staff attorney at the ACLU
Immigrants' Rights Project, added in the
statement, “Today's decision is a victory for
fairness and due process of law.” The ACLU
also served as counsel for plaintiffs in the
case.

The class action was filed by three
immigrants in late 2013, and although the
complaint isn't publicly available, a later
order from the court stated that the plaintiffs
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On the same day, the Ninth Circuit also
affirmed a lower court’s order certifying a
class of immigrant detainees and finding the
class could have bond hearings in a case
called Khoury v. Asher. Matt Adams, legal
director for the Northwest Immigrant Rights
Project, which represented plaintiffs in that
case, said in a statement that his team is “very
happy that the Court has rejected the
government's efforts to overstep their
authority in denying thousands of individuals
their basic right to a custody hearing.”

Jingni Zhao and Anoop Prasad at the Asian
Law Caucus, by Ashok Ramani of Keker &
Van Nest LLP and by Michael K.T. Tan of
the American
Civil
Liberties
Union
Foundation.
The government is represented by Hans
Harris Chen, Leon Fresco and Troy David
Liggett.
The plaintiffs in the Khoury case are
represented by Matt Adams and Christopher
Strawn at the Northwest Immigrant Rights
Project, by Robert Pauw at Gibbs Houston
Pauw, by Judy Rabinovitz at the ACLU
Immigrants' Rights Project, by Michael K.T.
Tan at the ACLU and by Devin T. TheriotOrr of Sunbird Law PLLC.

A representative for the U.S. Department of
Justice did not respond to a request for
comment.
Bond hearings are an active topic in the
immigration legal world. In June, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided to hear a case about
whether certain immigrants are entitled to an
automatic bond hearing after six months of
detention, adding another layer to the
national debate over immigrant detention.

The government in that case is represented by
Timothy Michael Belsan, Hans Harris Chen,
Leon Fresco and Lori Warlick.
The cases are Mony Preap, et al v. Jeh
Johnson, et al, case number 14-16326, and
Bassam Khoury, et al v. Nathalie Asher, et al,
case number 14-35482, at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The plaintiffs in the first case, Preap v.
Johnson, are represented by Julia Harumi
Mass at the ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, by Alison Edith Pennington,
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Chevron Deference
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“A Power Grab of Sorts, Buried in a Supreme Court Decision”
Bloomberg
Noah Feldman

June 24, 2018
As the U.S. Supreme Court’s swing justice,
Anthony Kennedy is used to making big
headlines in June. On Thursday, he did
something just as important as issuing a
major decision — but considerably harder to
capture in a few words.

interpretation of the law, so long as it is
reasonable.
For years, judges on both ends of the political
spectrum embraced the doctrine. Liberals
like Justice Stephen Breyer, a former
academic scholar of administrative law,
appreciated the way the doctrine empowered
technocratic experts at the agencies and
discouraged judges from second-guessing
them.

In a brief, solo concurrence in Pereira v.
Sessions, Kennedy called for reconsidering
and maybe overruling one of the cornerstones
of modern administrative law, known as
“Chevron deference.” If the Chevron
precedent is overturned, judges would have
more direct power to overrule policy
decisions made by agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency, the
Federal Communications Commission and
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Conservatives like the late Justice Antonin
Scalia (who was also an administrative law
scholar before becoming a judge) found the
doctrine appealing because it reflected the
value of judicial restraint, making it harder
for courts to reverse agency action from the
Ronald Reagan era.

Depending on how you count, Kennedy is the
fifth sitting justice to call Chevron into doubt.
His opinion is an opportunity to take a hard
look at whether the end of the doctrine would
be a bad thing or a good one.

In
Scalia’s
influential interpretation of
Chevron deference, the doctrine made
jurisprudential sense because Congress was
in effect telling judges to listen to the
agencies. Scalia thought judges should listen
to Congress and do as little as possible on
their own.

The Chevron doctrine, created by the
Supreme Court in 1984 in a case involving
the Chevron oil company, says that, when
Congress has passed a law that is both
ambiguous and directed to an administrative
agency, the courts will defer to the agency’s

But today’s judicial conservatism is not your
father’s judicial conservatism. Scalia’s
theoretical commitment to judicial restraint
(never mind whether he consistently
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by

Chevron deference.” That suggests that Alito
could join his conservative colleagues.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, while still an appellate
judge, openly criticized the Chevron doctrine
for taking the power to interpret the law away
from judges and giving it to agencies. That
resonates with a core value held by Kennedy,
that the judiciary (in practice: Kennedy) must
always have definitive say over the meaning
of the law.

On the other hand, in last week’s case, Alito
wrote a separate dissent of his own saying
that Chevron deference should have been
applied because the statute in question was
ambiguous. In his punchline, he wrote that
“unless the court has overruled Chevron in a
secret decision that has somehow escaped my
attention, it remains good law.”

Gorsuch clerked for Kennedy, and
Kennedy’s new opinion reflects a circular
path of influence: Kennedy taught Gorsuch
about judicial supremacy; Gorsuch used that
to attack Chevron; now Gorsuch is
influencing Kennedy to apply his own values
to Chevron, too.

This may conceivably imply that Alito is not
ready to jettison Chevron. It’s noteworthy,
too, that while Kennedy’s concurrence cited
opinions by Roberts, Thomas and Gorsuch, it
didn’t cite any Alito opinion calling Chevron
into question.

practiced it) has been replaced
conservative judicial activism.

Kennedy and Gorsuch make two. Justice
Clarence Thomas, the court’s only true, all-in
originalist, has his doubts about whether
administrative agencies, undreamed-of by the
founders, are even constitutional in the first
place. You can be sure he doesn’t like a
doctrine that empowers the agencies. Chief
Justice John Roberts hasn’t called for the
doctrine to go, but he has criticized the
overuse of Chevron before. That makes four.

If Alito is on board with the other
conservatives, what then? Liberals are
already worrying that the end of Chevron
would invite activist conservatives to
overturn agency action. That’s a logical fear.
If the conservatives want to end Chevron, it’s
at least partly because they want to be able to
constrain future Democratic-controlled
agencies. No matter what happens after
Donald Trump’s presidency, we are going to
have a more conservative judiciary because
of his appointees.

Justice Samuel Alito may be a wildcard. On
the one hand, he has criticized agency
overreach in reliance on supposedly
“ambiguous” statutes. In a speech to the
conservative Federalist Society in 2016,
Alito went so far as to claim (with some
plausibility) that “before his death, [Scalia]
was also rethinking the whole question of

Yet the truth is that liberals can’t really
mourn the end of Chevron too hard, because
liberals like judicial activism. Most liberals
since World War II aren’t really committed
to judicial restraint — except when liberals
don’t have five votes on the Supreme Court.
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Deep in liberals’ hearts, they know that
courts exist to interpret the law and must
often do so in the light of values. Scalia’s
fantasy that judges could be mere objective
rubber stamps is one that liberals must
recognize as unrealistic in many situations.

But the end of judicial deference to agencies
won’t be bad for the rule of law itself. That
rule is strengthened when judges — however
fallible, however motivated — use reason to
say what the law is, and take responsibility
for their judgments.

Seen from this perspective, the end of
Chevron could be bad for the environment,
bad for the internet, bad for securities
regulation, as conservative judges overturn
agency regulation.
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“The Federalist Society’s Chevron Deference Dilemma”
Law and Liberty
Christopher J. Walker

April 3, 2018
In 2016 here at Law and Liberty,
I asked whether administrative law’s judicial
deference doctrines matter. Leveraging
my study with
Kent
Barnett
on Chevron deference in the federal courts of
appeals, I argued that these doctrines do
matter. In this essay, I explore the related
question of whether Chevron deference
advances its stated objectives. In particular,
does Chevron deference
constrain
partisanship in judicial decisionmaking? The
answer to this question has important
implications for the current debate on
whether
to
narrow,
or
even
eliminate, Chevron deference.

come from the Hill, the federal bench, and the
legal academy. Last year it was front and
center during the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s hearing on Neil Gorsuch’s
nomination to the Supreme Court, as thenJudge
Gorsuch
had
authored
a
concurring opinion critical
of Chevron deference and its progeny. That
Gorsuch concurrence was quite reminiscent
of Justice Thomas’s earlier attack
on Chevron deference in his concurring
opinion in Michigan v. EPA. Indeed, last
week, the New York Times reported there’s a
new “litmus test” for judicial nominees,
which was applied in the selection of
Gorsuch for the Supreme Court: “reining in
what conservatives call ‘the administrative
state.’”

For the uninitiated, Chevron deference is the
judicial doctrine that federal agencies—and
not courts—are the primary interpreters of
statutes that Congress has charged the
agencies to administer. “If a statute is
ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s
construction is reasonable,” Justice Thomas
has explained, “Chevron requires a federal
court to accept the agency’s construction of
the statute, even if the agency’s reading
differs from what the court believes is the
best statutory interpretation.”

The call to eliminate Chevron deference has
largely come from those right of center. But
it would be a mistake to conclude that
everyone center-right is, or should be, in
favor of eliminating administrative law’s
deference doctrines. There is deep divide on
the right with respect to the role of federal
courts in our constitutional republic. Some
view courts as a critical safeguard of liberty,
and thus encourage courts to actively engage
in checking the actions of the political
branches. Think Randy Barnett and Philip
Hamburger. Others, by contrast, argue that

In recent years, there has been a
growing call to
eliminate Chevron deference. This call has
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because federal courts are not democratically
accountable, they should exercise judicial
restraint, embrace the “passive virtues” when
possible, and otherwise adopt a minimalist
and deferential approach to judicial review of
actions by the political branches. Think
Michael Stokes Paulsen and Adrian
Vermeule.

agency charged with the administration
of the statute in light of everyday
realities.”
In other words, Chevron deference strives to
remove
politics
from
judicial
decisionmaking. Such deference to the
political branches has long been a bedrock
principle for at least some judicial
conservatives.

For years, if not decades, the proper role of
federal courts has thus been subject to an
ongoing and vigorous debate within the
Federalist Society and related circles.

Does Chevron deference achieve this goal of
removing
politics
from
judicial
decisionmaking?

Indeed,
the Chevron Court
itself grounded this deference doctrine in part
on the need to reserve political (or policy)
judgments for the more politically
accountable agencies:

In an article forthcoming in the Vanderbilt
Law Review, Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd,
and I attempt to answer this question
empirically. To do so, we leverage
our Chevron dataset that includes every
published circuit-court decision that
involved Chevron or Skidmore deference
from 2003 through 2013. Over this elevenyear period, the federal courts of appeals
reviewed
1,613
agency
statutory
interpretations in 1,382 published opinions
where they considered applying either
deference doctrine.

“Judges are not experts in the field, and
are not part of either political branch of
the Government. Courts must, in some
cases, reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In
contrast, an agency to which Congress
has
delegated
policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of
wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy
choices—resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the

Contrary to prior, more limited studies, we
find that Chevron deference has a powerful
constraining effect on partisanship in judicial
decision-making. To be sure, we still find
some statistically significant results as to
partisan influence. But the overall picture
provides
compelling
evidence
that
the Chevron Court’s objective to reduce
partisan judicial decision-making has been
quite effective.
First, like earlier studies, we find that politics
does play some role in how circuit courts
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review agency statutory interpretations.
Liberal three-judge panels, for instance, are
more likely to agree with liberal agency
interpretations and less likely to agree with
conservative interpretations. Vice versa for
conservative panels. When we separate how
conservative and liberal panels act in cases in
which
they
apply Chevron deference,
however, we find that Chevron deference
significantly constrains judicial discretion.
For instance, the most liberal-judge panels
agree with conservative agency statutory
interpretations 51% of the time when they
apply the Chevron deference framework,
compared to just 18% when they don’t. The
most conservative-judge panels similarly
agree with liberal agency interpretations 66%
of the time with Chevron deference, and only
18% without.

interpretation, whereas liberal panels were as
much as 14% more likely than conservative
panels to find no ambiguity when reviewing
conservative
agency
interpretations.
Nonetheless, in contrast to Justice Scalia’s
view (rearticulated recently by Judge
Kethledge), we do not find that conservative
judges are more likely to find statutes
unambiguous regardless of the valence of the
agency interpretation.
We also find no “whistleblower effects.”
Whistleblower effects, as Cass Sunstein and
others
have explained,
involve
the
phenomenon of group polarization, in that
“[d]eliberating groups of like-minded people
tend to go to extremes.” The presence of a
panelist with opposing political preferences
can serve as a whistleblower of sorts, which
helps rein in the majority’s preference of
politics over legal doctrine in a given case.

That does not mean that Chevron eliminates
political behavior entirely. When it comes to
conservative agency interpretations, there’s a
23% difference in the likelihood of panels
across the ideological spectrum agreeing with
the agency under Chevron deference (and a
higher 36% difference when panels applied a
lesser form of deference). We found a similar
25% difference for review of liberal agency
interpretations under Chevron. When the
circuit courts do not apply Chevron, that
difference rises to a staggering 63%
difference.

Contrary to the famous Cross and
Tiller study, we find no whistleblowing
effects in the Chevron deference context:
Whether a panel is ideologically uniform or
diverse does not affect whether circuit courts
apply the Chevron framework, nor does it
affect agency-win rates on judicial review.
Indeed, we find only minor differences at
even the ideological extremes, and those
differences are strangely in the opposite
direction than expected. This finding might
seem surprising in light of the earlier, mostlimited empirical studies that found such
panel effects. But it’s not too surprising in
light
of
our
other
findings.
Because Chevron deference itself largely
constrains partisanship in judicial decisionmaking, the ideological composition of the

When the circuit courts decide to apply
the Chevron framework, they largely apply it
in a similar fashion, with only modest
ideological behavior. Conservative panels,
for example, were as much as 21% more
likely than liberal panels to find no ambiguity
when reviewing a
liberal
agency
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panel may have little, if any, additional
constraining role to play.

conservative judges, such as Judges Frank
Easterbrook, Thomas Griffith, David
Sentelle, and Jeffrey Sutton, similarly
demonstrated counter-ideological voting
patterns.

We also had a bit of fun looking at individual
judges who had at least 20 observations in our
dataset. Some liberal judges, including Judge
Stephen Reinhardt and then-Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, affirmed 100% of liberal agency
interpretations. But a few liberal judges,
including Judges Marjorie Rendell and
Robert Sack, indicate conservative behavior.
Likewise, a number of conservative judges
did not engage in ideological decisionmaking, though some did, including Judges
Jane Roth and Michael Fisher. A number of
conservative judges more favorably reviewed
liberal interpretations than conservative ones.
Judge Peter Hall voted to adopt 100% of
liberal interpretations. Other prominent

In sum, the findings from our study
underscore one significant and largely
overlooked cost of eliminating or
narrowing Chevron deference: Such reform
could result in partisanship playing a larger
role in judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations. It may turn out that, even with
this cost taken into account, some on the right
would conclude that such reform efforts
produce a net benefit. For many, however,
the cost of increased partisan judicial
decision-making should be a cause for
concern.
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“Undue Deference”
National Review
Jonathan Wood

July 29, 2018
For the second time in two years, President
Trump has nominated a justice to the
Supreme Court of the United States. His
selection of Brett Kavanaugh, like the
selection of Justice Neil Gorsuch before him,
shows the White House’s commitment to
selecting judges “devoted to a legal doctrine
that challenges the broad power federal
agencies have to interpret laws and enforce
regulations,” as the New York Times has put
it.

change their minds at any time, for any
reason; and to receive deference even for
interpretations expressed retroactively,” the
states acknowledge. But “there is a price to
be paid for these conveniences, and it is paid
by those who are subject to the agency’s
regulatory authority.”
California
Sea
Urchin
Commission demonstrates just how far we’ve
strayed from the Constitution’s design of
courts subjecting government actions to fair,
independent scrutiny. In 1986, Congress
struck a compromise that would encourage
the recovery of California’s sea-otter
population while minimizing unnecessary
impacts on fishermen. That compromise held
for decades, during which the otter
population increased dramatically.

If confirmed, that devotion may be quickly
tested. Led by Texas, 17 states
have urged the Supreme Court to take
up California Sea Urchin Commission v.
Combs and end Chevron deference — the
Court’s controversial and unconstitutional
practice of deferring to agencies on the
meaning of statutes, rather than having
independent judges interpret the law.

But in 2012, a federal agency decided it no
longer liked the deal Congress had struck. So
it reinterpreted the compromise, concluding
— conveniently — that the law allowed the
agency to keep its benefits from the bargain
while depriving the fishermen of theirs.
Represented by Pacific Legal Foundation, the
fishermen sued, arguing that nothing in the
law passed by Congress gave the agency such
power to rewrite the law.

For too long, the states argue, the
convenience of bureaucrats has been
weighted more heavily than fairness to the
American people.
“It is doubtless convenient for federal
agencies to have little restraint on their
interpretation of federal law; to be able to
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meaning as fairly as possible” (i.e., a judge)
with “an avowedly politicized administrative
agent seeking to pursue whatever policy
whim may rule the day.”

Unfortunately, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals — which embraces blind
deference to federal agencies with more zeal
than most courts — concluded that this didn’t
matter. The court ruled that a federal agency
can do whatever it pleases, so long as there’s
no law that explicitly forbids the precise
action. The court gave no answer as to just
how Congress was supposed to anticipate
every novel idea an agency might dream up
over decades.

Chief Justice John Roberts has similarly
raised an alarm about the concentration of
power in administrative agencies and the lack
of meaningful checks and balances. “The
danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state,” the chief justice has
cautioned, “cannot be dismissed.”
“We seem to be straying further and further
from the Constitution without so much as
pausing to ask why,” Justice Clarence
Thomas has separately observed.

With Kavanaugh on the bench, the Supreme
Court may finally be ready to
revisit Chevron and restore meaningful,
independent scrutiny to the administrative
state.

The fundamental principles underlying our
Constitution are that government power must
be divided up, rather than concentrated, and
those who exercise it must be accountable to
the people. It’s difficult to imagine a greater
departure from these principles than the
concentration of near-limitless power in the
hands of unelected bureaucrats, combined
with a lack of oversight from Congress and
the courts.

When courts reassert themselves and enforce
the law as written by Congress, it “helps
preserve the separation of powers and
operates as a vital check on expansive and
aggressive
assertions
of
executive
authority,” Kavanaugh wrote in a recent D.C.
Circuit ruling. His concern makes him a
fitting successor to Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who, in one of his final opinions,
urged the Supreme Court to “reconsider” the
premises underlying Chevron’s “reflexive
deference” to unelected bureaucrats.

With three sitting justices raising questions
about Chevron deference and another on
deck, it’s time for the Supreme Court to
address the issue head-on.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s first nominee,
has argued that excessive deference to
agencies
replaces
“an
independent
decisionmaker seeking to declare the law’s
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Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA)
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“The End of DACA Is the Next Big Immigration Fight”
Bloomberg
Noah Feldman

August 9, 2018
The struggle over the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program and the fate of
the immigrants known as “Dreamers” is
heating up again. There’s a strong probability
that it will go all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, and fast — conceivably even before
Judge Brett Kavanaugh gets a Senate vote on
his confirmation.

To understand the looming crisis, you have to
start with the rather remarkable fact that
DACA is still legally in place, even though
the Trump administration ordered it shut
down in September 2017. The reason that’s
so remarkable is that DACA isn’t a law
passed by Congress. It’s a unilateral
presidential enactment adopted by Obama.

The path to the Supreme Court passes
through the possibility of dueling nationwide
lower-court injunctions. There are already
orders mandating that President Donald
Trump’s administration keep in place
DACA, which shields from deportation
certain undocumented immigrants who came
to the U.S. as children. A federal district court
in Texas could soon issue a contradictory
order shutting it down.

Ordinarily, what one president can do by fiat,
another can undo by fiat. But in January, a
federal judge in California ruled that the
Trump administration had acted arbitrarily
when it shut down the program. He ordered
that DACA remain in place. Since then, a
couple of other federal district courts agreed.
My own view is that these courts got it
wrong. But Cass Sunstein, my colleague at
Bloomberg Opinion and Harvard Law School
and (among many other things) the leading
administrative law scholar in the
country, thinks the decision keeping DACA
alive was “eminently reasonable.” I won’t
bore you with the disagreement, which
centers on whether the Trump administration

That seems likely, because it’s the same
judge who in 2015 blocked Barack Obama’s
administration from implementing the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents policy, or
DAPA, which would have extended the
DACA protections to Dreamers’ parents.
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gave a good enough reason for shutting the
program down when it asserted that DACA
was illegal.

they maintain, there is no immediate need for
a preliminary injunction because the states
are suffering no irreparable harm from
continuing the program.

What matters practically is that the courts’
orders kept DACA going despite Trump’s
wishes.

I’m skeptical that Hanen will embrace that
distinction. He previously ruled that state
resources expended on DAPA were harmful
enough to issue his injunction. States are also
spending resources on DACA.
If and when Hanen strikes down DACA and
orders a nationwide injunction against it, the
Trump administration will be whipsawed
between competing court orders. Some
courts are ordering it to keep DACA going,
and Hanen would be ordering the opposite.

That led directly to a new federal lawsuit,
filed by Texas and seven other states, arguing
that DACA is in fact unlawful, because it
exceeded Obama’s presidential authority. A
hearing the case took place Wednesday.
It’s pure luck, but the judge who drew the
case, Andrew Hanen, is the same judge who
struck down DAPA. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld his opinion
in that case. And the U.S. Supreme Court
then split 4-4 after Justice Antonin Scalia
died, leaving the appeals court ruling in
effect. There can be little doubt that Scalia
would have voted to strike down DAPA.

In the face of contradictory orders, the
administration would seek expedited review
by courts of appeals. If those didn’t create
uniformity immediately — and that is the
most likely outcome — then it would turn to
the Supreme Court. After all, the high court’s
job is to ensure some modicum of legal
uniformity across the country.

As a matter of constitutional logic, if the
program for parents was beyond Obama’s
presidential authority, so was the program for
their children. And Hanen has already
demonstrated his willingness to issue a
nationwide injunction enforcing his ruling.
So it’s a pretty safe bet that Hanen will at
some point rule DACA unconstitutional.

All that could happen within days or even
hours of a ruling and injunction by Hanen.
And Hanen could perfectly well rule at any
time. He’s already thought through the
constitutional issues in issuing his DAPA
opinion.

That leaves the question of timing — which
could be all important here.

Nevertheless, Hanen can use his discretion to
choose when he wants to issue a decision and
an injunction. And he has a pragmatic reason
to take his time.

DACA supporters are arguing to Hanen that
unlike DAPA, which had not yet been
implemented when Hanen blocked it, DACA
has been in place for several years. Therefore,

That’s because the Supreme Court is evenly
split again, as it was when it voted on the 5th
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Circuit decision upholding Hanen’s DAPA
ruling.

compromise. But such a compromise would
almost certainly have to include keeping
DACA in place.

If the current Supreme Court had to consider
dueling nationwide injunctions, it could face
a serious crisis if i again divided 4-4. A split
court can only uphold the decision on appeal
before it. If a 5th Circuit decision upholding
a Hanen opinion remained in place, it would
put the Trump administration into a legally
untenable situation.

So it makes sense for Hanen to wait until
Kavanaugh is confirmed, and then issue his
ruling.
If that’s what happens, Kavanaugh may have
to swing into action pretty darn fast. He
would face his first controversial, emergency
vote in a high-profile case where his vote
would be decisive.

Of course, moderates like Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and
Elena Kagan could hammer out a temporary

It won’t be his last.
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“Judge Upholds Order for Trump Administration to Restore DACA”
New York Times
Miriam Jordan

August 3, 2018
A federal judge on Friday upheld his
previous order to revive an Obama-era
program that shields some 700,000 young
immigrants from deportation, saying that the
Trump administration had failed to justify
eliminating it.

new applications from those who meet the
criteria to qualify. DACA recipients — often
called “Dreamers” — typically were brought
to the United States illegally as children
through no choice of their own.
Judge Bates ruled in late April that the
administration must restore the DACA
program and accept new applications. He had
stayed his decision for 90 days to give the
Department of Homeland Security, which
runs the program, the opportunity to lay out
its reasons for ending it.

Judge John D. Bates of the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia gave the
government 20 days to appeal his decision.
But his ruling could conflict with another
decision on the program that a federal judge
in Texas is expected to issue as early as next
week.

Kirstjen Nielsen, the homeland security
secretary, responded last month, arguing that
DACA
would
likely
be
found
unconstitutional in the Texas case and
therefore must end. She relied heavily on the
memorandum that her predecessor, Elaine C.
Duke, had issued to rescind the program and
said that the department had the discretion to
end the program, just as the department under
Mr. Obama had exercised discretion to create
it.

The Trump administration announced late
last year that it would phase out the program
known as Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA, which protects
undocumented
young
adults
from
deportation and grants them two-year
renewable work permits. The administration
argued that President Barack Obama had
overstepped his authority and circumvented
Congress when he created the program in
2012.

Judge Bates, who was appointed by President
George W. Bush, did not agree. He called the
shutdown of the program “arbitrary and
capricious” and said that Secretary Nielsen’s
response “fails to elaborate meaningfully on

The decision to end the program has faced
numerous legal challenges. Currently, the
government must continue accepting
applications to renew DACA status, if not
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the agency’s primary rationale for its
decision.”

“Princeton University’s continued success as
a world-class institution of learning and
research depends on our ability to attract
talent from all backgrounds, including
Dreamers,” he said. Brad Smith, the president
of Microsoft, said that finding a solution for
DACA “has become an economic imperative
and a humanitarian necessity.”

Two federal judges, in Brooklyn and in San
Francisco, issued injunctions this year
ordering the government to keep the
program. But neither of those rulings
required that the government accept new
applications, as the ruling by Judge Bates
does. The earlier decisions are pending
before appeals courts.

Since the 2016 presidential campaign, the
young people who benefited from DACA
have seen their hopes alternately elevated and
dashed, sometimes in the space of a week.
Neither a flurry of court decisions nor horsetrading in Congress has settled the issue.

Meanwhile, the State of Texas and several
other plaintiffs have sued the government to
rescind the program, contending that it is
illegal.

In a statement on Friday, United We Dream,
an organization that represents Dreamers,
offered a sobering assessment: “The situation
for DACA beneficiaries remains dangerous
and unstable, as we do not know how the
administration will respond, and there are
other court cases in progress.”

The District of Columbia lawsuit was
brought by the N.A.A.C.P., Microsoft and
Princeton University. The DACA program
has broad bipartisan support in the business
and academic worlds.
Christopher L. Eisgruber, the president of
Princeton, hailed the court’s decision.
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“Kavanaugh Could Stymie Trump’s Immigration Policies”
Bloomberg Law
Laura D. Francis

July 10, 2018
President Donald Trump’s nomination of
Judge Brett Kavanaugh to replace Justice
Anthony Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme
Court isn’t necessarily a guaranteed win for
the president’s immigration policies.

But “the conservative tilt to the court
becomes a big question mark when it comes
to immigration” because many of the cases
involve a “strict” interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, he said.
That means conservative justices could go
against
the
Trump
administration’s
interpretations of the INA, he said.

The Trump administration already is facing a
host of lawsuits on a variety of immigration
issues: ending the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program and temporary
protected status, state and local “sanctuary”
policies on whether to cooperate with federal
immigration enforcement, and some
challenges to limits on business visas.

The Supreme Court “has given Congress
plenary authority to write the immigration
law,” said Leopold, a past president and past
general counsel of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association. So it’s possible that
Kavanaugh and the other justices will “hold
the Trump administration to the letter of the
law” when it comes to the INA’s provisions
on employment visas, he said.

Kavanaugh
hasn’t
addressed
many
immigration cases while on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
But he’s likely to face at least some if
confirmed to replace Kennedy.

Kavanaugh is “very much a careful jurist who
looks at the statute and looks at the regulation
and tries to determine whether the executive
branch’s regulation is consistent with the
statute,” said Kevin R. Johnson, dean of the
University of California, Davis, School of
Law.

“We’re going to see a lot more business
immigration litigation because of the
unreasonably restrictive decisions” from U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, David
Leopold of Ulmer & Berne in Cleveland,
Ohio, told Bloomberg Law July 10.

“He’s going to call it as he sees it,” Johnson
told Bloomberg Law July 10. “I don’t think
he’s going to allow the executive branch to
go beyond what he views as the requirements
of the statute,” he said.

Some of those cases may make their way up
to the Supreme Court.

‘Question Mark’ on Immigration
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The Immigration and Nationality Act “is
clear on what constitutes a specialty
occupation,” the type of job covered by the
H-1B guestworker visa, Leopold said.
Instead of following that law, the
administration is “making it up as they go
along,” he said.

of the president’s power not to enforce the
law.
The president “possesses a significant degree
of prosecutorial discretion not to take
enforcement actions against violators of a
federal law,” he wrote. In fact, because of
separation of powers concerns, “Congress
may not mandate that the President prosecute
a certain kind of offense or offender,”
Kavanaugh said.

“Brett Kavanaugh is a superb choice to fill
the current vacancy in the U.S. Supreme
Court,”
Federation
for
American
Immigration Reform President Dan Stein
said in a July 10 statement. “President Trump
should be commended for choosing a
candidate who clearly understands the
nation’s patchwork of immigration laws and
how they are intended to protect both
American workers and the overarching
national interest,” he said.

Johnson said it’s “very hard to tell” how
Kavanaugh would rule on the DACA issues.
Considering that the Supreme Court tied 4-4
when it considered the challenge to the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents program,
Kavanaugh could very well be the swing vote
one way or another, he said.

FAIR advocates for lower immigration
levels.

“The first question that comes to mind is
where is he going to be on prosecutorial
discretion,” Leopold said. Kavanaugh’s
viewpoint in this area doesn’t just affect
DACA, it “affects business immigration as
well,” he said.

Pro-DACA?
“With
important
immigration-related
decisions heading to the Supreme Court—
including the challenge to the Obama-era
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA)—Judge Kavanaugh will provide
expert insight into the legality of the program
and the ability of future administrations to
circumvent Congress and create tailored
amnesty programs for large groups of illegal
aliens,” Stein said.

‘Tremendous Discretion’
The Immigration and Nationality Act gives
“tremendous discretion to the executive,”
Leopold said.

But Kavanaugh’s views of the executive’s
authority may in fact result in a ruling in
favor of DACA.

That was the view of the sitting justices in the
recent case involving the president’s travel
ban, which turned on the president’s
authority under the INA to block the entry of
certain immigrants.

In a 2013 decision involving nuclear waste
storage, Kavanaugh took an expansive view

“The court has a long history of deferring to
the executive” when “it comes to national

422

security,” Leopold said. It’s possible that the
justices may rule differently on immigration
law questions involving employment, he
said.

Leopold said he thinks “the real challenge for
the justices” is “to set aside their political
opinions and not to permit politics into the
courtroom.”

Johnson agreed, especially when it comes to
Kavanaugh. “He might be more deferential to
the executive” in a case involving national
security than in a “run-of-the-mill”
immigration case, Johnson said.

“The hope is we have intellectual honesty,”
he said.
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“Judge’s Ruling Isn’t Going to Save the Dreamers”
Bloomberg
Noah Feldman

January 10, 2018
A federal judge in California on
Tuesday blocked
President
Donald
Trump from rescinding the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals program, which he
had planned to phase out in March. The
impulse to protect the so-called Dreamers is
admirable. But legally speaking, the opinion
can’t be correct. If President Barack Obama
had the legal authority to use his discretion to
create DACA in the first place -- itself a close
legal question -- Trump must have the legal
authority to reverse DACA on the ground that
he considers it to have exceeded Obama’s
powers.

executive agencies and be sure their actions
are based on reasoned policy logic. But
the law makes an exception for any decision
that is “committed to agency discretion by
law.”
The original DACA order was based on the
president’s discretionary authority to decide
how to enforce federal immigration law.
Recall that Dreamers have no statutory right
to be in the country -- they are the children of
undocumented immigrants. DACA was,
formally
speaking,
an
announced
discretionary decision by the executive
branch not to deport Dreamers.

District Judge William H. Alsup’s ruling was
based on a provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act that says executive agency
actions must not be arbitrary and capricious.
The court held that it was arbitrary for
Trump’s Department of Homeland Security
to rescind DACA. It reasoned that because
DACA was legal, Homeland Security could
not rescind it for being illegal.

In court, the Trump administration argued
that if DACA was itself an exercise of
discretion, the decision to revoke DACA
must similarly be an exercise of discretion
and not subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. In other
words, the courts have no business telling the
president that he cannot reverse a
discretionary decision by a previous
president.

This logic may sound plausible. But it runs
into multiple legal problems.

The federal judge rejected this argument by
saying that while the decision not to deport
was indeed discretionary and not subject to
review, the decision to deport was not
discretionary in the same way. It added that

The first has to do with applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard to DACA in the first
place. The Administrative Procedure Act
functions so that the courts can supervise
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there was further reason to review Homeland
Security’s move because DACA had invited
Dreamers “out of the shadows” and reversing
the program would subject them to
consequences that would infringe on the
liberty and property interests created by the
original order.

The federal district court in California
disagreed. It said that DACA was legal in the
first place, and that the Supreme Court never
said otherwise. It concluded that ending
DACA “was based on the flawed legal
premise that the agency lacked authority to
implement DACA.” And it rejected the
notion that it was up to the executive branch
to decide whether to defend DACA in court,
especially in the 5th Circuit where it is
arguably illegal under the precedent of the
DAPA program.

There’s something appealing about this
argument. Certainly prosecuting or deporting
someone is active in the way that deciding not
to do so is not. Yet it’s difficult to accept that
once the government decides not to prosecute
or deport someone, it must then justify the
decision to change its mind. The asymmetry
isn’t especially consistent with general
principles of administrative law.

This analysis cannot be correct. One
presidential administration is entitled to
disagree with the legal analysis of another.
What’s more, the president has the right to
interpret the Constitution when it comes to
the legality of his own actions. He doesn’t
have to wait for a court to tell him something
is illegal. He can judge for himself.

The second significant legal problem with the
California court’s decision is its assertion that
it was arbitrary and capricious for Homeland
Security to rescind DACA.
The main basis the government gave for
ending DACA was that it was illegal when
Obama enacted in the first place -- it
exceeded his constitutional authority. This
was essentially the view taken by the federal
district court in Texas that froze the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans plan that
was DACA’s twin sibling, allowing the
undocumented parents of citizen children to
stay in the country. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit agreed. The U.S.
Supreme Court split 4-4 on the issue after
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death and before
Trump named Justice Neil Gorsuch to the
court.

And the legal judgment that DACA exceeds
presidential authority certainly isn’t arbitrary
or capricious. A federal court of appeals and
four Supreme Court justices have already
said DAPA was. If it weren’t for Scalia’s
death, it’s highly probable that the majority
of the justices would have taken that view.
And it seems even more likely that Gorsuch
would now provide the deciding fifth vote to
say DACA is unconstitutional.
Trump’s Department of Homeland Security
can’t have been acting arbitrarily because its
judgment aligns with these authorities.
The California judge cited Trump’s proDACA tweets as evidence that continuing the
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program serves the public interest. That’s
cute, but misleading. Trump is calling for
congressional legislation to continue DACA,
not for executive action.

I deeply hope some version of DACA is
signed into law. But this judicial decision
isn’t going to save the Dreamers, no matter
how well-intentioned it might be.
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“A Judge Supports Dreamers and the Rule of Law”

Bloomberg
Cass R. Sunstein

January 16, 2018

Though Democrats might celebrate, that’s a
horrible idea. The executive branch can’t
simply assert that the decisions of its
predecessor were “illegal.” It has to justify
that conclusion. If it isn’t able to do that, it
must come up with better grounds for
changing course.

The White House was quick to condemn a
federal judge’s decision last week striking
down the Trump administration’s efforts to
terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program. It called the ruling
“outrageous,” and President Donald Trump
tweeted that it shows “how broken and unfair
our court system is.”

In a nutshell, that’s what Judge William
Alsup told the Trump administration last
week in his DACA decision.

But the judge’s decision to invalidate the
program’s termination, and thus to protect
young immigrants who were brought to the
U.S. illegally as children, was not
outrageous. Strictly as a matter of law, it was
eminently reasonable — whatever Congress
does or does not do in the coming days and
weeks.

As the judge explained, “DACA grew out of
a long agency history of discretionary relief
programs,” going back to the Dwight
Eisenhower administration and including
major initiatives under Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Such
“programs had become a well-accepted
feature of the executive’s enforcement of our
immigration laws, recognized as such by
Congress and the Supreme Court,” Alsup
wrote.

To begin to understand why, imagine that in
2021, a Democratic president — say, Bernie
Sanders — starts repealing dozens of
regulations issued during the Trump
administration, on the ground that the new
attorney general believes those regulations
are “illegal.”

When it adopted the current DACA program
in 2012, the Barack Obama administration
said that the young people seeking to qualify
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for its protections had to meet certain
criteria. They had to have come to the U.S.
before the age of 16, and they had to have
resided continuously in the country for at
least five years. They also had to have been
enrolled in school, and graduated from high
school or obtained a GED, or been honorably
discharged from the U.S. military or Coast
Guard. And they could not pose a threat to
national security or public safety. More than
650,000 young people residing in the U.S.
meet these standards.

general was right to conclude that DACA was
illegal.
The judge thought not. He said that “each
feature of the DACA program is anchored in
authority granted or recognized by Congress
or the Supreme Court.” In his view, the
executive branch is perfectly entitled to
conclude that DACA enrollees are lowpriority cases for removal and to direct its
enforcement priorities elsewhere.
The Trump administration’s strongest
response pointed to a 2014 appeals court
ruling, striking down a related Obama
administration program that protected the
parents of lawful permanent residents from
deportation. If that program is invalid, it
could be argued that DACA is invalid, too.

Those who qualify under the DACA program
are not to be detained or removed for two
years from the time that they successfully
apply for its protections (unless they do
something wrong). They can also obtain
Social Security numbers and receive
authorization to work.

That’s not a crazy argument. But as Judge
Alsup emphasized, the DACA program is
quite different. Focusing specifically on
children, it is more limited than the program
covering immigrant parents, and it builds
more incrementally on longstanding
practices; it stands on firmer legal ground.

In September 2017, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions wrote a short letter to the acting
secretary of Homeland Security, stating that
the program was an “unconstitutional
exercise of authority by the Executive
Branch.” Because it offered no serious
analysis of why that was the case,
the letter was a shoddy document from a
legal point of view. But the next day, Acting
Secretary Elaine Duke, referring to the letter,
rescinded DACA.

Importantly, the judge did not rule out the
possibility that in the future the Trump
administration might be able to defend a
decision to rescind the program. Agencies are
perfectly entitled to change course, so long as
they offer a reasoned explanation for doing
so.

In invalidating this rescission, Judge Alsup
applied a well-established principle, widely
ignored even by expert commentators: An
agency’s action must be upheld or
invalidated only on the basis of the specific
reasons the agency itself has given. So the
only question was whether the attorney

Perhaps the government could explain that
the program does not fit with the Trump
administration’s
overall
immigration
strategy, because the protection it affords is
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too broad and categorical. The problem is
that it never made that argument.

officials must
decisions.

A broader principle is at stake. A central
distinction between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian systems is that in the latter,
executive officials have an obligation to obey
the law. An equally central distinction is that

They cannot simply assert their power or
their will. In insisting on reason-giving,
Judge Alsup’s ruling keeps faith with the best
traditions of our legal system — and the rule
of law.

429

give

reasons

for

their

Sanctuary Cities

430

“Full appeals court to hear case on injunction against Trump sanctuary policies”

Politico
Josh Gerstein

June 4, 2018
The full bench of the federal appeals court
based in Chicago has agreed to consider
whether a District Court judge went too far in
imposing a nationwide ban against
enforcement of Trump administration
policies seeking to block so-called sanctuary
cities from receiving Justice Department
grants.

There is no reason to expect the judges will
vote along party lines, however. All three
judges who voted earlier this year to uphold
the ruling in Chicago’s favor, including the
one who said he would narrow it, are
Republican appointees.
The April ruling rejected efforts by the
Justice Department to impose new grant
conditions requiring that cities, counties and
states
cooperate
with
immigration
enforcement efforts in order to get so-called
Byrne Justice Assistance Grants.

th

In April, a three-judge panel of the 7 U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
nationwide inunction that the city of Chicago
obtained against the policy. However, one
judge, Daniel Manion, said he would have
narrowed the injunction to protect only
Chicago.

In a strongly worded opinion, Judge Ilana
Rovner said that allowing federal agencies to
add conditions to grant funds without explicit
congressional authority could lead toward
“tyranny.”

Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who has
railed against nationwide injunctions as a
power grab by the judiciary, asked the entire
bench of the 7th Circuit to rein in the
injunction. On Monday, the court said in an
order that a majority of its active judges had
voted to consider doing just that.

“The Attorney General in this case used the
sword of federal funding to conscript state
and local authorities to aid in federal civil
immigration enforcement,” Rovner wrote, in
an opinion joined by Judge William Bauer.
“But the power of the purse rests with
Congress, which authorized the federal funds
at issue and did not impose any immigration
enforcement conditions on the receipt of such
funds. It falls to us, the judiciary, as the

The en banc court could consist of as many
as 13 judges: the court’s 11 active judges plus
the two senior judges on the original ruling.
The overall set of judges leans heavily in the
Republican direction, with 11 GOP
appointees and two Democratic appointees.
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remaining branch of the government, to act as
a check on such usurpation of power.”

explicitly endorsed the nationwide element of
the ruling.

The narrower dispute going before the full
bench of the 7th Circuit will solely involve
whether U.S. District Court Judge Harry
Leinenweber, based in Chicago, was right to
apply his ruling nationwide, even though the
city was the only plaintiff in the suit before
him.

Judges and activists on the right and left have
defended the nationwide injunction practice
as appropriate in at least some cases, in order
to prevent disparate treatment in different
parts of the country, particularly in
immigration-related cases.

In a speech last year, Sessions slammed what
he called the “activist” practice of judges
issuing nationwide injunctions purporting to
bind federal officials across the country and
sometimes around the globe.

The Supreme Court has never issued a
detailed opinion on the validity of nationwide
injunctions, but one expert said there was
some chance the grant-related dispute could
wind up getting the justices to square up to
the issue.

“Forgive me for feeling strongly about this,”
the attorney general said at the time. “Today,
more and more judges are issuing nationwide
injunctions and in effect single judges … are
making themselves superlegislators for the
entire United States. … A single judge’s
decision can enjoin the entire federal
government from acting. It’s an extreme step.
Too often, district court judges are doing it
without following the law.”

“If the Supreme Court does not reach the
scope of the injunction in the travel ban case,
this is the most likely vehicle for the question
to reach the Court,” UCLA law professor
Sam Bray said in an email, referring to the
president’s disputed executive order banning
entry into the United States by nationals of
several countries, most of them majorityMuslim. “The Seventh Circuit’s decision to
rehear en banc suggests growing judicial
concern about national injunctions.”

Sessions has repeatedly complained that the
Trump administration has been swamped
with such injunctions, but he has
acknowledged that they began to pick up
under President Barack Obama. At least one
such order, a Texas federal judge’s 2015
injunction blocking Obama’s expansion of
protection for certain illegal immigrants, won
praise from Sessions while he was a senator.
However, it’s unclear whether he ever

Even if the 7th Circuit lifts the nationwide
injunction in the case about grants to cities
with sanctuary policies, the Trump
administration policies may still not take
effect. That’s because another federal judge,
based in San Francisco, also blocked the
policies nationwide. His order is on appeal to
the 9th Circuit.
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“Sanctuary cities as the next nationwide injunction test case”
SCOTUS Blog
Steve Vladeck

June 19, 2018
However the Supreme Court decides the
travel ban case in the next 10 days, it may
well avoid taking a position on one of the
numerous issues raised in that litigation —
whether the district court in Trump v.
Hawaii lacked the authority to issue a
nationwide injunction. But the justices may
not be able to duck the broader debate over
the propriety of nationwide injunctions for
much longer, thanks to an unusual
application for a “partial” stay filed by
Solicitor General Noel Francisco on Monday
in Sessions v. City of Chicago.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois agreed with the city with
respect to two of the three challenged
conditions — the “notice” condition, which
requires advance notice to federal authorities
of the release date of persons in state or local
custody who are believed to be noncitizens,
and the “access” condition, which requires
local correctional facilities to provide access
to federal agents to meet with those persons.
Both of those conditions, the district court
ruled, could not be traced to any statutory
authority, and therefore exceeded the
attorney general’s authority to impose
unilaterally. And because of considerations
the district court deemed unique to
immigration law, not only did Judge Harry
Leinenweber enjoin the attorney general
from continued enforcement of the
conditions against the city of Chicago, but he
issued the injunction on a nationwide basis.

The City of Chicago case is one of several
pending challenges to actions taken by
Attorney General Jeff Sessions under
Executive Order 13,768, which provides that
certain “sanctuary jurisdictions” that refused
to comply with some immigration
enforcement measures would not be “eligible
to receive Federal grants, except as deemed
necessary for law enforcement purposes” by
the attorney general or secretary of
Homeland Security. As relevant here, the city
of Chicago sued challenging conditions that
the attorney general subsequently imposed
under the executive order on receipt of funds
under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grant Program, claiming that they
were both unlawful and unconstitutional.

After refusing to stay the injunction pending
appeal, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed in
April 2018, unanimously concluding that no
statute granted the attorney general the
authority to impose the “notice” and “access”
conditions. As for the nationwide scope of
the district court’s injunction, a majority of
the 7th Circuit panel stressed that
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“nationwide injunctions should be utilized
only in rare circumstances,” but concluded
that the city’s suit was one such
circumstance, because “[t]he case presents
essentially a facial challenge to a policy
applied nationwide, the balance of equities
favors nationwide relief, and the format of the
Byrne JAG grant itself renders individual
relief ineffective to provide full relief.” Judge
Daniel Manion dissented only with respect to
the nationwide nature of the injunction. As he
wrote, “Other jurisdictions that do not want
to comply with the Notice and Access
conditions were not parties to this suit, and
there is no need to protect them in order to
protect Chicago.”

Given the full 7th Circuit’s refusal to rule
immediately on the stay application, the
solicitor general on Monday filed an
application for a partial stay directly with
Justice Elena Kagan, in her capacity as
Circuit Justice for the 7th Circuit. The
application asks Kagan to stay the nationwide
scope of the district court’s injunction
pending the en banc 7th Circuit’s disposition
of the government’s petition for rehearing —
which looks like it will be argued later this
summer — and, “if necessary, pending the
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ
of certiorari and further proceedings in this
Court.” Later on Monday, Kagan ordered a
response to the application — by 5:00 p.m.
on Wednesday, June 27 (by which point the
Supreme Court may well have decided the
travel-ban case).

The government sought en banc rehearing of
the panel decision only with respect to the
nationwide scope of the injunction, and a stay
of that aspect of the injunction (but not the
injunction itself) pending disposition of its
petition. On June 4, the 7th Circuit granted
rehearing en banc “only as to the geographic
scope of the preliminary injunction entered
by the district court,” but deferred the
government’s request for a ruling on its
application for a stay until the Supreme Court
decided the travel ban case, which “may
facilitate our disposition of the pending
motions.”

Thus, although the government is not
challenging the substance of the district
court’s injunction, it appears willing to use
that injunction as a vehicle to challenge the
propriety of nationwide injunctions more
generally — perhaps more so than in the
travel ban or DACA litigation. Whether the
justices are interested in such a challenge
(especially in a case in which the government
may be all-but conceding the weakness of its
position on the merits) remains to be seen.
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“Judge: Trump overstepped in sanctuary city order”
Boston Herald
Kimberly Atkins

August 2, 2018
The battle between the Trump administration
and so-called “sanctuary cities” appears
bound for the U.S. Supreme Court after a
federal
appeals
court
declared
unconstitutional the president’s executive
order stripping funding from localities that
don’t cooperate with federal immigration
authorities.

Other cases out of Philadelphia and Chicago
are also making their way through the courts
and are likely bound for the U.S. Supreme
Court — particularly if any appellate court
rules in the administration’s favor, creating a
circuit split.
Opponents of the order declared victory, as
supporters said it still leaves the door open for
Congress and the White House to take other
steps to press states and local governments to
cooperate
with
federal
immigration
authorities.

The ruling was a mixed bag for the Trump
administration, striking down the order while
also lifting the nationwide ban against its
implementation.

“Put simply, the president cannot use the
threat of defunding as a weapon to force local
governments to abandon politics that make
their communities safer,” said Santa Clara
County, Calif., Counsel James R. Williams.

But 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Sidney R. Thomas held in the 2-1 ruling that
Trump overstepped his constitutional
authority, reasoning that only Congress has
the power to grant or deny funding — a
power the president cannot circumvent.

Jessica M. Vaughan of the Center for
Immigration Studies, which supports
Trump’s order, said that it was good policy
regardless of the court’s constitutional
reasoning — and said other courts, including
the Supreme Court, could see it differently.

“Here, the Administration has not even
attempted to show that Congress authorized
it to withdraw federal grant moneys from
jurisdictions that do not agree with the
current
Administration’s
immigration
strategies,” Thomas wrote. “Nor could it. In
fact, Congress has frequently considered and
thus far rejected legislation accomplishing
the goals of the Executive Order.”

“What would be better is for Congress to
clarify,” Vaughan said. “But Congress can’t
get out of its own way on anything, especially
immigration-related matters.”
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The vacancy on the high court, left by Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s retirement this week,
could delay a move by the justices to take up
the case to avoid a potential 4-4 deadlock.

Senate Judiciary Committee for a hearing
until September, committee chairman Chuck
Grassley (R-Iowa) said yesterday. That
would put a vote on his confirmation some
time in October — after the court’s new term
has already commenced.

Trump’s nominee to replace Kennedy, Judge
Brett Kavanaugh, likely won’t go before the
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“Trump administration won’t defend ACA in case brought by GOP states”
The Washington Post
Amy Goldstein

June 7, 2018
The Trump administration said Thursday
night that it will not defend the Affordable
Care Act against the latest legal challenge to
its constitutionality — a dramatic break from
the executive branch’s tradition of arguing to
uphold existing statutes and a land mine for
health insurance changes the ACA brought
about.

The bold swipe at the ACA, a Republican
whipping post since its 2010 passage, does
not immediately affect any of its provisions.
But it puts the law on far more wobbly legal
footing in the case, which is being heard by a
GOP-appointed judge who has in other recent
cases ruled against more minor aspects.
The administration does not go as far as the
Texas attorney general and his counterparts.
In their suit, lodged in February in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, they argue that the entire law is now
invalid.

In a brief filed in a Texas federal court and an
accompanying letter to the House and Senate
leaders of both parties, the Justice
Department agrees in large part with the 20
Republican-led states that brought the suit.
They contend that the ACA provision
requiring most Americans to carry health
insurance soon will no longer be
constitutional and that, as a result, consumer
insurance protections under the law will not
be valid, either.

By contrast, the Justice brief and letter say
many other aspects of the law can survive
because they can be considered legally
distinct from the insurance mandate and such
consumer protections as a ban on charging
more or refusing coverage to people with
preexisting medical conditions.

The three-page letter from Attorney General
Jeff Sessions begins by saying that Justice
adopted its position “with the approval of the
President of the United States.” The letter
acknowledges that the decision not to defend
an existing law deviates from history but
contends that it is not unprecedented.

A group of 17 Democratic-led states that
have won standing in the case also filed a
brief on Thursday night arguing for the
ACA’s preservation.
While the case has to play out from here, the
administration’s striking position raises the
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possibility that major parts of the law could
be struck down — a year after the Republican
Congress failed at attempts to repeal core
provisions.

University of Michigan law professor
Nicholas Bagley, another ACA defender,
went even further in a blog post. “If the
Justice Department can just throw in the
towel whenever a law is challenged in court,
it can effectively pick and choose which laws
should remain on the books,” he wrote.
“That’s not a rule of law I recognize. That’s
a rule by whim. And it scares me.”

In an unusual filing just before 6 p.m.
Thursday, when the brief was due, the three
career Justice attorneys involved in the case
— Joel McElvain, Eric Beckenhauer and
Rebecca Kopplin — withdrew.

Crusading against the ACA has been a
priority of Trump’s since his campaign for
the White House. On his first night in office,
Trump issued an executive order, directing
federal agencies to lighten the regulatory
burden placed by the law. Last October, the
president unilaterally ended a significant part
of the law that cushions insurers financially
from an obligation to give discounts to
decrease out-of-pocket costs to lower-income
customers with ACA coverage.

The department’s argument, if adopted by
U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor, “would
be breathtaking in its effect,’ said Timothy
Jost, a retired Washington and Lee law
professor who follows such litigation closely.
“Of all of the actions the Trump
administration has taken to undermine
individual insurance markets, this may be the
most destabilizing. . . . [If] I’m an insurer, I
don’t know what I am supposed to do or not.”
Jost, an ACA supporter, noted that the
administration’s decision not to defend the
law comes during the season when
participating insurers must file their rates for
next year with state regulators. It raises new
questions about whether insurers still will be
required to charge the same prices to all
customers, healthy or sick.

More recently, the White House and
Department of Health and Human Services
have been working to make it easier for
consumers to buy relatively inexpensive
health plans that exclude some of the benefits
the ACA requires.
The new challenge comes six years after the
Supreme Court’s divided ruling that the ACA
is constitutional. That ruling hinged on the
reasoning that, while the government “does
not have the power to order people to buy
health insurance,” as Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. wrote for the majority, it “does
have the power to impose a tax on those
without health insurance.”

And Topher Spiro, vice president of health
policy at the liberal Center for American
Progress, said the administration’s legal
argument contradicts promises by Trump that
he would not tamper with the ACA’s
protections for people with preexisting
medical conditions.
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The case in Texas, which has attracted
relatively little notice until now, emerges
from the massive tax bill Congress passed
late last year. In that, lawmakers decided to
eliminate the tax penalty the ACA requires
people to pay if they flout the insurance
mandate. The enforcement of that
requirement will end in January.

But the administration disagrees with that
position. Instead, Justice officials argue in
their brief that the ACA’s insurance
requirement will not become unconstitutional
until January, so that “the injury imposed by
the individual mandate is not sufficiently
imminent” and that the judge could issue a
final ruling in the case before then.

As a result, the Texas lawsuit contends, “the
country is left with an individual mandate to
buy health insurance that lacks any
constitutional basis. . . . Once the heart of the
ACA — the individual mandate — is
declared unconstitutional, the remainder of
the ACA must also fall.”

O’Connor, who is hearing the suit, was
appointed by President George W. Bush and
has ruled against the ACA in other cases the
past few years.
Until Thursday’s filing, the Trump
administration had not indicated its position
on either this latest lawsuit or the Republican
states’ effort to block the law while the case
moved along.

Texas and the accompanying states have
asked for a preliminary injunction that could
suspend the entire law while the case plays
out in court.
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“Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare Is Illegal”
New York Times
Nicholas Bagley and Abbe R. Gluck

August 14, 2018
From the moment he took office, President
Trump has used all aspects of his executive
power to sabotage the Affordable Care Act.
He has issued executive orders, directed
agencies to come up with new rules and used
the public platform of the presidency in a
blatant attempt to undermine the law. Indeed,
he has repeatedly bragged about doing so,
making statements like, “Essentially, we are
getting rid of Obamacare.”

part of the Affordable Care Act that they
could. That order has prompted a series of
administrative actions aimed at undermining
the law.
To make it harder for people to enroll in
Obamacare plans, for example, the
administration shortened the open enrollment
period on the health care exchanges from
three months to six weeks; cut 90 percent of
the funding that the exchanges had used to
advertise open enrollment; and slashed the
funding available to groups that help people
navigate the complex enrollment process.

But Mr. Trump isn’t a king; he doesn’t have
the power to dispense with laws he dislikes.
He swore to preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States. That
includes the requirement, set forth in Article
II, that the president “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.”

To sow chaos in the insurance markets, Mr.
Trump toyed for nine months with the idea of
eliminating a crucial funding stream for
Obamacare known as cost-sharing payments.
After he cut off those funds, he boasted that
Obamacare was “being dismantled.”

Faithfully executing the laws requires the
president to act reasonably and in good faith.
It does not countenance the deliberate
sabotage of an act of Congress. Put bluntly:
Mr. Trump’s assault on Obamacare is illegal.

When Congress declined to repeal the
Affordable Care Act, as Mr. Trump had
requested, he said that he was taking on that
job himself: “So we’re going a little different
route.”

Among Mr. Trump’s first acts in office was
to issue an executive order instructing his
agencies “to waive, defer, grant exemptions
from, or delay the implementation of” any
441

Trump’s attempt to destroy the law any way
he can is an unconstitutional usurpation of
power.

This month, the Trump administration dealt
what may be its biggest blow yet to the
insurance markets. In a new rule, it
announced that insurers will have more
latitude to sell “short-term” health plans that
are exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s
rules. These plans were designed to provide
people insurance for small gaps in coverage,
like those created when switching jobs. They
had previously been limited to three months.

That is also the message of a lawsuit — the
first of its kind — filed this month in federal
court in Maryland. Brought by several
plaintiffs including the cities of Chicago,
Cincinnati and Columbus, the lawsuit
recounts the “relentless and unlawful
campaign to sabotage and, ultimately, to
nullify” the Affordable Care Act. Taken
individually,
some
of
the
Trump
administration’s actions may be defensible.
Taken together, they amount to a derogation
of his constitutional duties.

Under Mr. Trump’s new rule, however, such
plans can last for 364 days and can be
renewed for up to three years. That rule joins
an earlier one that allowed businesses to join
together to create “association health plans”
that also evade the Affordable Care Act’s
strictures. In effect, these rules are creating a
cheap form of “junk” coverage that does not
have to meet the higher standards of
Obamacare. This sort of splintering of the
insurance markets is not allowed under the
Affordable Care Act as Congress drafted it.

The lawsuit asks the court to strike down the
administration’s new rules and to enjoin the
president from further sabotage. To prevail,
the plaintiffs may have to overcome some
procedural hurdles, including questions about
whether the courts have the authority or the
institutional
competence
to
prevent
violations of Article II’s requirement that the
president “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed” — especially given the wide
discretion that presidents traditionally have to
implement the laws.

The Trump administration’s goal is not only
to weaken the Affordable Care Act but also
to trick the public into thinking, as opponents
of the law like to say, that Obamacare is
“collapsing under its own weight.” Let’s be
clear: If the Affordable Care Act collapses, it
is because the president demolished it.

But if there is ever going to be a viable claim
along these lines, this is it. After all, no court
has ever held that the president has the power
to consciously aim, in bad faith, to destroy
Congress’ handiwork. Yet with his attacks on
this law, that is precisely what Mr. Trump has
been doing. No matter how you feel about
Obamacare, we should all care about that.

Never in modern American history has a
president so transparently aimed to destroy a
piece of major legislation. What makes Mr.
Trump’s sabotage especially undemocratic is
that Congress has repeatedly considered
repealing the law — and repeatedly declined
to do so. In addition, the Supreme Court has
twice sustained the Affordable Care Act in
the face of major legal challenges. Mr.
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